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Abstract
The thesis contains three chapters relating to household and rm investment. The rst
chapter, coauthored with Silvia Albrizio, investigates the relationship between scal con-
solidation, business plans, and rm investment. Based on a detailed narrative of tax
changes in Germany covering 40 years of scal adjustments, we dene and exploit the
exogenous variation of tax bills to quantify the eect of tax changes on rms’ future
investment plans as well as on realized investment. We nd that rms in the manufac-
turing sector revise downward both planned and realized investment subsequently to tax
adjustments. Furthermore we nd that income and consumption taxes are most harm-
ful to investment and that rms base their investment plans considering laws currently
under discussion, anticipating future tax changes. In the second chapter, I investigate if
irreversible household investment decisions are aected by behavioral factors, namely
Projection Bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003)). I use detailed weather
data to test if exceptional sunny months have a positive and signicant impact on solar
photovoltaic (PV) adoption at county level and interpret my ndings as strong support
for the Projection bias hypothesis given that other weather shocks (temperature, rain,
and snow) do not show a signicant impact. Results are robust to a wide variety of
robustness checks and shock denitions. Elaborating on heterogeneity, I conrm that
political ideology can play an important role in expectation formation: counties with
higher share of Green voters are more perceptive to Projection Bias in their solar in-
vestment decisions. The nal chapter investigates the role of economic policy for the
installation of solar PV in Germany. After empirically evaluating the variables that play
a key role in the household investment decision, I construct a dynamic stochastic dis-
crete choice model of technology adoption to evaluate how dierent policy dimensions
aect the household investment choice and aggregate technology uptake. The simula-
tion exercise shows that an increase in the annual tari reduction for new installations
(degression rate) has the biggest negative impact on investment.
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Preface
This thesis consists of three papers that are related to household and rm investment
in the context of sustainability. In recent years, the discussion of sustainability has not
only emerged under the background of climate change and "green growth", but due to
the nancial and economic crisis also with regard to government budgets. Chapter 1
analyzes the eects of scal adjustments on investment, a key issue given budgetary
pressure in many OECD countries and the need to return to a steady growth path after
the recent period of economic downturn. On the other hand, Chapter 2 and 3 refer to in-
vestment in sustainable energy. The energy market transformation towards renewables
have made households a key player in the provision of decentralized green energy, such
as solar photovoltaics (PV). In this context Germany has taken on a leading role with the
introduction of targeted support policies that found wide adoption in Europe and other
countries worldwide. Nevertheless still little is known about the right choice of policy
instruments to incentivize investment while maintaining low policy cost and about the
household investment decision per se. Literature from durable goods purchases has fur-
thermore shown that households’ choices might not be fully rational and can be aected
by behavioral factors. The papers are discussed briey in turn:
Chapter 1 is joint work with Silvia Albrizio1 and focuses on the eects of scal con-
solidation measures (tax adjustments) on rm investment. Previous literature (see for
example Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012)) has pointed out that business investment
is the main driver of the strong negative eect of tax-based consolidation on aggregate
output, however has been unable to provide a causal link between scal consolidation,
rm expectations and realized investment changes. We aim at closing this gap by com-
bining a detailed narrative of tax changes with rm level investment data that capture
both realized and planned investment. For this purpose we revise in detail a narrative of
German tax legislation, as developed by Uhl (2013), and merge it with rm level invest-
ment data obtained from the IFO investment survey, for which we have data available
for the period 1970-2010. We nd a strong negative eect on both planned and realized
investment. Furthermore we nd that income and consumption taxes are most harmful
to investment and that rms base their investment plans considering laws currently un-
der discussion, anticipating future tax changes. Not taking into account this anticipation
1OECD, EUI
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eect would lead to biased estimates.
Chapter 2 on the other hand investigates if irreversible household investment deci-
sions are aected by behavioral factors, namely Projection Bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue,
and Rabin (2003)). In particular, I combine data from solar photovoltaic (PV) installations
in Germany with detailed weather data and test if exceptional sunny months have a pos-
itive and permanent impact on technology adoption at county level. I nd a strong and
robust eect and interpret my ndings as clear evidence of Projection Bias, given that
only sunshine and no other weather shocks (temperature, rain and snow) have a sig-
nicant and permanent eect on technology uptake. A one standard deviation shock in
terms of monthly sunshine hours leads to an aggregate increase in investment of around
8% when evaluated at the mean. Elaborating on heterogeneity, I nd that political ide-
ology can play a key role in expectation formation: counties with higher share of green
party voters respond stronger to sunshine outliers in their solar investment decision.
These ndings are in line with the literature investigating the role of political ideol-
ogy for the formulation of eective policies (see for example Costa and Kahn (2013)) and
should be taken into account when the policy makers objective is to increase investment
in climate friendly technologies such as renewables or energy ecient installations.
Finally, Chapter 3 focuses on the role of economic policy for the household investment
decision in solar PV in Germany. After empirically evaluating the variables that play a
key role in the household investment decision, I construct a dynamic stochastic discrete
choice model of technology adoption to evaluate how dierent policy dimensions aect
the household investment choice and aggregate technology uptake. Structural param-
eters are estimated by simulated method of moments. The simulation exercise shows
that an increase in the annual tari reduction for new installations (degression rate) has
the strongest negative impact on investment. The model predicts furthermore that an
exogenous increase in electricity prices leads to additional installations, a feature that
seems to be present also in the empirical data.
iv
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Chapter 1
The investment eect of scal consol-
idation.
With Silvia Albrizio (OECD, EUI)
1.1 Introduction
Fiscal consolidation represents one of the main challenges that policy makers are cur-
rently facing in most OECD countries. Understanding how dierent scal consolidation
measures (i.e. spending cuts and tax increases) aect growth is therefore crucial. In
a recent paper, Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) show empirically that tax-based
scal adjustments have a statistically signicant dierent eect on output compared
to spending-based adjustments. The former ones are not only more costly in terms of
output loss than spending adjustments, but they can be also linked to longer-lived re-
cessions. The macro analysis of Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) focuses on a large
set of OECD countries and points out that the strong eect of tax-based consolidation
on output is driven by shifts in business investment. Understanding further the links be-
tween scal consolidation, business condence and rm investment is even more crucial
in periods of excessive debt and/or decit, when the economy needs an eective growth
policy agenda. Therefore, our analysis focuses on tax adjustments and tries to shed light
in the interconnection between tax adjustments, business condence and investment.
Previous studies have been unable to capture the causal link between these elements
either due to the aggregate nature of the data, which does not allow matching rm ex-
pectations with their investment behavior, or due to the endogeneity of the scal policy,
as one of the key issues in estimating the impact of economic policy is the identication
of exogenous scal shocks.
To deal with the unavailability of rm investment expectations, previous literature
focuses mainly on realized investment both at the macro and at rm level. Alesina
1
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and Perotti (1996), using case studies, stress the "credibility eect" that a decisive dis-
crete change in the scal policy stance may have on interest rates which would crowd
in private investment. Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (1999) associate one
percentage point of GDP increase in labor tax with a decrease of aggregate investment
over GDP by 0.17 on impact and a cumulative eect of about 0.7 in ve years. Conrm-
ing these results, Cloyne (2011), Mertens and Ravn (2009), and Hayo and Uhl (2013)
nd a negative, sizable and statistically signicant eect of tax increase on investments
at the aggregate level. At rm level, previous literature builds heavily on neoclassical
models of investment based on the user cost of capital and the Q-theory1. In the user-
cost framework, higher taxes aect investment negatively through the increase in user
cost of capital. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) exploit cross-sectional varia-
tion in user cost due to major tax reforms. They nd signicant eects with an implied
long-run elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the user cost between -0.5 and
-1.0 2. Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1998) analyze UK rm investment behavior using
both the underlying Q-theory and user cost of capital, and their estimated eect reduces
to -0.25. Finally, micro evidence based on cointegration models ( Caballero, Engel, and
Haltiwanger (1995) among others) estimates an average long-run relationship between
capital-output ratio and the user cost of -0.1, where estimates range between -0.01 and -2.
Regarding the second limitation, the identication of exogenous scal shocks, the eco-
nomic literature distinguishes three main methodologies. The rst branch of literature
follows the structural vector autoregressive approach (SVAR). In this approach, exoge-
nous scal shifts are unobservable and identication is achieved using sign restrictions
derived from economic theory ( Mountford and Uhlig (2009)) or by taking into account
institutional features of tax and transfer systems ( Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). The
VAR approach has led to a wide range of estimates of the spending multiplier (see Ramey
(2011) for a literature survey). The second group of studies consists mainly of case stud-
ies ( Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Ardagna (2010), and Alesina and Ardagna
(2012)) nd that spending based adjustments can have a very small or no output cost at
all. Finally, a more recent method that found increasing attention in the economic liter-
1See Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for a comprehensive overview of microeconometric models of invest-
ment and employment.
2Additional rm-level evidence on the user-cost elasticity of the investment rate is given by Schwellnus
and Arnold (2008) and Johansson (2008).
2
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ature is the narrative approach. Identication is based on observable exogenous shifts
in scal stance by considering ocial documents, and hence by denition focusing only
on scal adjustments that are motivated by decit reducing purposes. As pointed out
in Mertens and Ravn (2013), an attractive feature of this approach is that the narrative
record summarizes the relevant features of a potentially very large information set.
This paper aims at lling the above described research gap, investigating further the
set of correlations and causality between tax adjustments and private investment, in or-
der to provide clear insights on the impact of scal reforms on rm incentives, and there-
fore on growth. In particular, we contribute to the debate in three ways: Firstly, by con-
sidering micro level data we move one step further in establishing a causal link between
tax-based scal consolidation, business condence and investment. Taking advantage
of the information on rms’ planned investment provided by the IFO investment sur-
vey3, we are not only able to compare our micro-based results with the previous ndings
from the macro literature, but also to take into consideration forward-looking behavior
of the rms. Secondly, the detailed structure of the dataset allows us to disentangle the
eect in two dierent dimensions: a heterogeneous eect depending on rm size and
on the industry sub-sector. In line with Romer and Romer (2010) and Pescatori, Leigh,
Guajardo, and Devries (2011), we employ the narrative approach to identify exogenous
tax adjustments. Based on a detailed narrative created by Uhl (2013) for Germany, we
revise 40 years of documented tax legislation (1970-2009) in order to create a dataset
of tax adjustments that are not cyclically driven nor dictated by long-term growth con-
siderations. We further investigate the timeline of tax adjustment not only considering
the publication date, as provided by Uhl (2013), but also looking for the date when the
public discussion of the adjustment started. To do so, based on the LexisNexis database,
we collect journalistic documents that discuss each of the tax changes we considered.
Finally, focusing on one country only, we are not only able to consider a much more
accurate policy dataset, testing the results for dierent shock reference dates (discussion
date, publication and rst implementation date) but also to disentangle the eect accord-
ing to the type of tax change (income tax, business and corporate tax, or consumption
tax). In fact, as pointed out in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Cloyne and Surico (2013),
3EBDC Business Investment Panel, http://www.cesifogroup.de/ifoHome/facts/EBDC.html
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there is little reason to expect that the dierent types of taxes available to governments
all have the same impact on the economy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the series
of exogenous tax shocks as developed by Uhl (2013), and which have been adopted for
the purpose of this paper, as well as the rm level investment data. Section 1.3 describes
in detail the identication and the estimation strategy, while the main results are dis-
cussed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 further elaborates on heterogeneity and section 1.6
performs a series of robustness and sensitivity checks. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Tax shocks and firm investment data
1.2.1 Narrative of German tax changes
The series of tax changes is based on Uhl (2013), who elaborates an extensive record of
tax legislation in Germany4. In order to identify all relevant tax law changes Uhl (2013)
uses in a rst step a size criteria of the budgetary impact of tax changes. Tax shocks
are thus considered important and are included in the narrative if their budgetary im-
pact reaches 0.1% of GDP in a given year5. This rst criterion led to the identication of
95 important tax changes that are revised in a detailed fashion in Uhl (2013) and that
are classied according to their main motivation in "endogenous" and "exogenous" tax
measures in line with the previous literature (see for example Romer and Romer (2010),
Pescatori, Leigh, Guajardo, and Devries (2011) and Cloyne (2013))6.
4The analysis in Uhl (2013) is based mainly on the Finanzbericht and Bundesnanzplan of the Federal
Republic of Germany. In order to recover all budgetary details of individual tax laws we revised the
Finanzbericht for the years 1970-2009 and the four-year budget plans (Bundesnanzplan) for the time
period 1990-2009.
5Tax shocks are also included if the measure is (close to but) below the 0.1% GDP threshold but tax
law changes consist of individual well dened measures. Other narratives, such as Pescatori, Leigh,
Guajardo, and Devries (2011) do not state a precise cuto rule, however for their full dataset of scal
adjustments, only 5 out of 173 fall below the 0.1% rule, none for Germany.
6As the previous literature building on the narrative approach we slightly abuse terminology and con-
sider "exogenous" all changes that are not systematically correlated with current or lagged output and
investment.
4
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Key in the narrative approach is to identify the exact motivation behind each tax
change, as this allows excluding tax policy changes dictated by business cycle uctu-
ations and changes correlated with the dependent variable through other unobserved
factors. As pointed out in Romer and Romer (2010), simply regressing output growth
on all legislated tax changes will lead to biased estimates, given the fact that some tax
changes might be correlated with the error term. Moreover, this bias might be even
more emphasized in case the researcher does not account for the fact that the policy
makers might adjust their policy measures to the current state of the economy, for ex-
ample employing countercyclical policies. Even controlling in the regression framework
for known macroeconomic shocks and conditions would not solve the issue of identi-
cation, as rstly it would be impossible to proxy for all information about future out-
put movement that the policy maker may have had and secondly the response to tax
changes is likely to vary from period to period and may be hence correlated with other
unobserved factors in the error term. Thus it is crucial to identify the exact motivation
behind individual tax changes.
We align our classication of the motivation of tax changes with Uhl (2013), however
we revise each of the Uhl tax shocks and regroup them according to "exogenous" and
"endogenous" for our analysis of investment. Uhl (2013) classied spending driven tax
changes, countercyclical policies and tax changes due to macroeconomic shocks as "en-
dogenous" measures. On the other hand, "exogenous" measures are those dealing with
budget consolidation and structural considerations. While consolidation measures are
related only to past spending and are exogenous to the current macroeconomic stance,
the category of structural tax changes is more controversial as it includes both mea-
sures that aim at long-term growth, incentivizing investment, as well as tax changes
that have been induced by court-rulings and that are hence unrelated to investment ac-
tivity. Therefore, building on the previous narrative-literature, in our reclassication we
dene as "exogenous" only those structural changes that are not cyclically driven nor
motivated by long-term growth considerations and hence aimed at investment. The ap-
pendix provides some examples of tax changes and their classications7.
Given the fact that we have exact information on the timing of individual tax mea-
7For a complete overview of all important tax measures in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Uhl
(2013).
5
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Figure 1.1: Legislated tax changes. Half-yearly frequency
sures - the date the rst draft was introduced to the parliament, the date the tax law
was published and information on the public discussion in the newspapers - we test
for the impact at dierent dates. Dierently from other studies that use this approach,
we consider the budgetary impact at announcement. This choice relieves us from di-
cult considerations regarding revisions that are potentially correlated with investment
and the contingent economic situation8 as well as from potential measurement errors.
Furthermore, to avoid heterogeneous displacement eects, we focus on exogenous tax
shocks that are announced and implemented within the same period.9 Figure 1.1 de-
picts the full series of important tax changes in Germany announced and implemented
within the same period for both "exogenous" and "endogenous" motivations for the pe-
riod 1970-2009, using half-yearly data frequency. As the graph shows clearly, endoge-
nous tax changes are on average larger and more frequent than the exogenous category.
In total, we count with 19 exogenous shocks and 31 endogenous ones. The correlation
between the two time series is 0.09, and is not statistically signicant (p-value of 0.53).
8Examples of factors correlated with investment which could drive the revisions are: resistance from
trade unions, deterioration of the economic situation, etc.
9This is in line with the previous literature. See for example Mertens and Ravn (2011) that exclude tax
changes with implementation lag exceeding one quarter. In the robustness section we also control for
shocks that are announced but that are implemented in subsequent periods.
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Given data availability our main analysis focuses on the period 1970-201010. As ex-
plained in more detail in the following section, we group tax changes in both yearly and
half-yearly periods in line with our rm level investment data. The original tax shock
series, expressed in billions of Euros (governmental budgetary impact), has been rst de-
ated using the gross xed capital formation deator for the manufacturing industry11
and divided by total value added (VA) in the manufacturing industry in 2005, in order to
have the main regression variables at a similar scale, which allows for easier interpreta-
tion of the coecients. The exogenous shock series contains both positive and negative
tax measures ranging from -0.011 to 0.014 with a mean absolute impact of 0.002 and a
standard deviation of 0.004.12
In terms of timing, focusing on the subset of exogenous shocks, the average length
from the date the draft of the law is introduced to the parliament and the date of publi-
cation of the same is around ve months 13. On the other hand the average time between
publication and rst implementation of the tax measure is two months. However a de-
tailed revision of the shocks brings the fact to light that most of the shocks are induced
by a lengthy public discussion prior to the initiation of the legal process of tax change.
The media and newspapers report these discussions and we refer to the date of the rst
article mentioning as "discussion date". In order to check for this possibility we look
at the timing of news coverage of tax measures prior to the draft date using the online
database LexisNexis. We nd that the average time lag between initial discussion of the
tax measure and its publication is one year. The appendix provides an overview (Table
1.2) containing discussion, draft and publication date of selected tax shocks14.
10Our last scal shock is observed in 2009, however we include one additional year of rm investment
data to capture the lagged investment eect.
11The deator is based on STAN Industry Rev. 3, 2008 (OECD) Database. Investment and nancial vari-
ables are deated in the same way.
12We use the mean absolute impact rather than the simple mean, given both positive and negative shocks.
Alternatively the mean impact of the 12 positive shocks has been 0.005 (0.004) shocks, and for the seven
negative shocks -0.004 (0.004).
13The exact draft date can only be reconstructed for shocks posterior to 1977.
14Using LexisNexis, we were able to track back news coverage for tax adjustments for the period 1992 to
2010.
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1.2.2 Firm investment data
Data on rm investment is obtained from the IFO investment survey (IVS). As pointed
out in Seiler (2012) the IVS was originally introduced in 1955 and considers the man-
ufacturing sector in Germany, however annual investment data is available only from
the mid 1960s onwards. While the initial questionnaire has been distributed only once
a year, from 1993 onwards the survey has been performed bi-annually, in spring and
autumn of the same year, leading to an even richer data structure15.
The IVS questionnaire focuses mainly on rm investment activity and includes both
forward and backward looking statements of realized and planned investment. As the
questionnaire includes only a small list of potential control variables, the dataset has
been enriched by the Economic and Business Dataset Center (EBDC) with balance sheet
data obtained from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt16. The merged investment data counts
with a total of 202,368 observations that belong to 5,590 rms. In principle the dataset
is longitudinal however the number of rm that exit at some point in time the panel is
high, so that there are few rms reporting the entire sample period. In terms of rep-
resentativeness, in 2009 the IVS sample covered 31% of all employment in the German
manufacturing sector (7% of companies), with better representation of bigger rms (2%
of employment size class < 50 and 66% of employment class size >1000).17
For the purpose of our analysis, the original dataset has been rst converted to Eu-
ros, using the xed Euro-DM exchange rate and then deated with the OECD deator
for gross xed capital formation in the manufacturing industry. Furthermore we drop
IFO sector 210 from the analysis, manufacture of mining products, as it does not nd a
clear correspondence in the ISIC manufacturing classication. Converting the dataset
to an annual data structure, and constructing the change in realized investment as log
dierence of investment at time t and investment at time t − 1, we are left with 64,310
15Data previous to 1991 corresponds to West Germany, while data posterior to 1991 includes also rm
from former Eastern Germany.
16The exact merging procedure is described in Seiler (2012).
17The authors would like to thank Heike Mittelmeier and Christian Seiler from the EBDC for providing
this information regarding the IVS.
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observations belonging to 5,186 distinct rms18 19
Most of the literature dealing with rm level investment considers as dependent vari-
able the ratio of investment (dened as the change in capital stock) over capital. Even
though the IFO data provides a direct measure of investment, it does not provide us with
an initial capital stock20. Therefore, as alternative measure we normalize investment by
rm specic average asset stock over the sample period, which is available for the subset
of rms that have been merged with the Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases. Never-
theless also this procedure reduces the sample coverage considerably. Therefore we use
this specication only as robustness check for our ndings, estimating a dynamic rm-
level investment model as derived in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005) (see section
1.6).
Our empirical analysis focuses both on realized investment growth and on updates
of planned investment. However updates of planned investment are only available for
the subsample period 1993-2010, in which the IVS has been conducted at a bi-annual
frequency. In each round rms are asked to provide an estimate for their planned in-
vestment for the same year. In addition, in spring rms are asked how much they have
been investing in the previous year (realized investment in t − 1) and, in autumn, how
much they are planning to invest next year (t + 1). Therefore the richness of the IFO
investment dataset allows us considering both realized investment changes and updates
in planned investment. Formally, realized investment growth in year t is dened as:
∆ln(It) = ln(It,A) − ln(It−1,A) (1.1)
18Conditioning our sample on rms that report in two consecutive periods does not change signicantly
the size composition: For the full sample (sample in dierences) there are 17.6% (15.6%) in size group
up to 49 employees, 31.9% (31.2%) in size group up to 199 employees, 34.7% (35.8%) in the size group
up to 999 employees and 15.8% (17.3%) in the category >1000.
19We allow for zero growth in case a rm reports zero investment in two consecutive years. As robustness
check we further experiment with a second specication, imputing a small, but positive number for
investment in years t or t-1 in case a rm reports in either of the two periods zero investment. Given
that this procedure leads to additional variability, for the analysis we cut the variable at the rst and
99th percentile to make the measure outlier proof. We nd that our results are not aected by the
specication of the dependent variable.
20Backtracking the capital stock using inventory methods would be only meaningful for balanced data
or data with few gaps.
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while the change in planned investment is dened for reference year t, respectively in
each period p=1 between 1 October (t-1) and 31 March (t) and p=2 between 1 April (t)
and 30 September (t), as:
∆ln(PIt,1) = ln(PI
t
t,S) − ln(PI
t
t−1,A) (1.2)
∆ln(PIt,2) = ln(PI
t
t,A) − ln(PI
t
t,S) (1.3)
where the subscript indicate the year and the survey round (S=spring, A=autumn) when
the plan is revealed, while the superscript refers to the forecast horizon, i.e. the year the
investment is supposed to take place. The exact timing of the half-yearly investment
structure is depicted in Figure 6 in the appendix.
1.2.3 Summary statistics and representativeness
Table 1.1 shows the main variables of interest for our analysis at annual frequency for
the full sample period and two subsample periods 1970-1990 (West Germany only) and
1991-2010. The main dependent variable, realized investment growth is small in absolute
terms, however as the standard error suggests there exists considerable variation across
rms. The alternative measure (investment over average capital stock) has a mean of
0.25 (median of 0.18), which however includes more bigger rms. The exogenous scal
shock measured in terms of total value added in the manufacturing industry is very sim-
ilar for the two time periods in terms of the average, however the standard error in the
later period (1991-2010) is almost the double. For comparative purposes Table 1.1 also
reports the aggregate control variables for the interest rate as well as sales growth and
rm size (number of employees), as these variables are reported for all rms in the ques-
tionnaire 21. While the interest rate has been around 1% higher in the early subsample
(1970-1991), average sales growth was nearly double compared to the second sample pe-
riod. These tendencies are related to general structural changes in the German economy.
In order to provide further evidence on the representativeness of our data, Figure 1.7
in the appendix compares realized changes in aggregate investment in the manufactur-
ing sector in Germany obtained from STAN (OECD, Rev.3 2008) with aggregation based
21As mentioned, other nancial covariates, such as assets and liabilities, are only available for a subset of
rms (those listed in either Amadeus or Hoppenstedt and that could be merged).
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Mean% std Mean% std Mean% std
Realized%investment%change 20.0110 (21.046) 0.0297 (0.965) 20.0424 (1.104)
Investment%/%Average%total%assets 0.2520 (0.229) 0.2580 (0.234) 0.2487 (0.226)
Exogeneous%fiscal%shock 0.0011 (20.006) 0.0013 (0.004) 0.0010 (0.007)
3%month%interbank%rate 2.4670 (21.616) 3.0911 (1.904) 2.0205 (1.186)
Sales%growth 0.0231 (20.261) 0.0312 (0.225) 0.0164 (0.288)
Total%employment%last%year 837 (5195) 948 (5247) 753 (5154)
Observations 64310 27936 36374
Note:%Investment%/%Average%total%assets%counts%with%a%total%of%39751%observations.
Total&sample:&197002010 Subsample:&199102010Subsample:&197001990
Table 1.1: Summary statistics: main variables
on our sample data. The gure indicates that the series co-move closely over the entire
sample period but that our aggregation based on rm data shows slightly more variabil-
ity than the ocial statistics. Furthermore the appendix provides some rst evidence for
the negative correlation of our scal shock measure and aggregate investment growth.
The two series show a correlation coecient of -0.15 (Figure 1.8). We present the same
evidence by ISIC 3 industry sub-sector and by size group (Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 in
the appendix).
1.3 Identification and empirical specification
As pointed out above, the key assumption behind the narrative approach is that both
the tax changes itself and their composition are "exogenous" i.e. tax changes are not
dictated by business cycle uctuations nor long-term growth concerns. In line with the
previous literature (see for example Cloyne and Surico (2013)), we test for exogeneity
using a four-variable VAR at annual frequency including the tax shock series (for both
the endogenous and exogenous category), GDP growth, the three month interbank rate
and the average investment change as main dependent variable 22. We construct the
aggregate change in investment as log dierence of average investment in period t and
t-1 weighted by employment shares 23. The selection-order criterion suggests in most
22In an alternative specication, we also account for the structural break due to the German reunication
(1990) and the recent nancial and economic crisis (post 2007); our results are robust to the inclusion
of these exogenous dummies.
23We also test for other measures of aggregation, using changes in total investment from period t to period
t+ 1, and hence conditioning on rm presence in two consecutive years, or using simple unweighted
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specications unanimously a lag structure of order one for the VAR. Table 1.3 in the
appendix provides evidence from the granger causality tests, showing that the exoge-
nous tax shock series implemented in the same period of the publication date cannot
be predicted neither by macroeconomic conditions in the last year, nor by past invest-
ment activity. On the other hand, the "endogenous" tax adjustments can be predicted by
economic growth (p-value 0.063). The three excluded series jointly (investment growth,
GDP growth and interest rate) moreover carry information to forecast the endogenous
scal shock series at 10%. These results strongly support our key identication assump-
tions 24.
As second test for exogeneity of our scal shock series we run an ordered probit re-
gression to see if the government’s decision to adjust taxes can be predicted by past
macroeconomic data. The same approach has been taken by Cloyne and Surico (2013)
and Mertens and Ravn (2009). We hence construct an indicator variableωt equal to 1 if
the government implements a positive scal shock, zero if no action has taken place and
-1 if there has been a negative scal adjustment. Results are presented in Table 1.4 in
the appendix and indicate that while movements in the exogenous shock cannot be pre-
dicted neither by lagged changes in aggregate investment nor by lagged levels of GDP,
the endogenous shocks are correlated to lagged investment growth. As additional test,
we run the ordered probit model on ocial data from the manufacturing sector (Table
1.5) using both changes in gross xed capital formation (GFCF) and levels of GFCF from
the OECD (STAN) database. While the results for GFCF growth are fully comparable
with our in-sample ndings (only lag 2 of GFCF growth) is signicantly correlated with
the endogenous shock, for the levels equation we nd strong evidence that movements
in the endogenous series are highly correlated with both lagged levels of investment
and GDP. The shocks that have been classied "exogenous" on the other hand are not
predictable.
Using the exogenous tax adjustment series, our analysis rst focuses on the revision
average investment change. The main results hold for all denitions of aggregate investment. We
furthermore test that the investment series are stationary, using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
24Given the fact that our tax shock series includes both structural and consolidation motivated shocks,
as sensitivity check, we furthermore exclude all shocks with structural motivation. The presented
ndings are robust to the selection of shocks.
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of investment plans, and secondly, we study how realized investment is aected. Both
analysis are based on the following main regression specication:
∆Ii,j,t = α+ βm(Lm)τt +ψmt−1 + ρgt−1 + ν∆zi,t−1 +D90 +D07 + θj + i,j,t
(1.4)
where ∆Ii,j,t is the growth rate of realized investment for rm i, in sector j, in period
t. The investment changes are dened separately for realized and planned investment as
introduced in section 1.2. The scal shock τt is the exogenous tax adjustment published
at time t, and is uncorrelated with other shocks to investment by construction. Macro-
level controls consist of the monetary policy stancemt−1 (previous period three-month
interbank rate) and economic condition gt−1 (lagged levels of GDP). Dummies to ac-
count for the crisis period 2007-2010 (D07) and for the structural change 1990 (D90) are
included in the regression equation25. Finally, lagged sales growth at rm level (∆zi,t−1)
is part of the regression controls to proxy for current and future demand conditions
at rm level. In all specications we include furthermore sectorial xed eects θj and
standard errors are clustered at rm level 26
1.4 Main regression results
The following section presents the main regression results for both planned and realized
investment growth at rm level. Table 1.13 in the appendix also provides some evidence
for the eect of scal shocks on realized investment changes aggregated at sub-sector
level.
1.4.1 Planned investment
As previous contributions have suggested (see for example Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi
(2012)), business condence and private investment are found to be the main drivers of
25To account for the structural break in the statistical data more than the actual historical date of the
German reunication.
26Given the fact that our main explanatory variable is aggregated at annual level, we potentially could
cluster on years, however clustering on year assumes that rm level errors are uncorrelated from one
year to another, an assumption that is unlikely to hold. Alternatively we test for clustering at industry
sub-sector (branch). The main ndings are unaected by the choice of the clustering variable.
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the output eect of scal consolidation. Studying the change in future investment plans
at micro level helps to understand and pin down the business expectation and condence
channel. As mentioned in section 1.2, in the IVS rms are asked about their investment
plans for next period. Given the opportunity cost of investments, these plans, and in par-
ticular their revisions, incorporate business expectations and anticipation about future
economic and policy conditions.
Insert Table 1.6 here
We observe updates on planned investment for the period 1993 to 2010 at a bi-annual
frequency. For this period, we count with a total of 10 exogenous scal shocks with a
mean impact of 0.001 and a standard deviation of 0.0048. Moreover given the fact that
our analysis focuses on the announcement eect of scal policy, we use the shock pub-
lication date. Table 1.6 presents the estimates of the eect of a tax change equal to 1% of
total manufacturing value added on the revision of planned investment. Block 1 (column
(1) - (3)) includes only lags of the scal shock, while block 2 (column (4) - (6)) includes
also leads. For the rest, the two blocks include the same set of covariates: the rst col-
umn of each block includes a set of aggregate controls (lagged GDP, lagged three month
interbank rate, and a dummy accounting for the recent nancial crisis) in addition to
industry xed-eects, the second column includes additionally lagged rm level sales
growth, and nally the third column includes rm level xed eects. In all specica-
tions we furthermore include a separate dummy for the second half-year (autumn), in
order to account for potential dierences in volatility of the two revisions27, which re-
sults to be highly signicant in all specications.
Block 1 shows that there is a signicant and negative eect of tax shocks on planned
investment. A shock equal to one standard deviation of the exogenous scal shock28
hence translates to a decrease in planned investment of around 1.2% in the next invest-
ment plan. Once we additionally include leads, in order to test for a potential anticipation
27Due to a lower degree of uncertainty, the autumn investment update might be more accurate and hence
less volatile than the spring update. The authors would like to thank Antonello d’Agostino for pointing
this out in his discussion at the Banca d’Italia Fiscal Policy Workshop 2014.
28As the shock can take on both positive and negative values, we standardize using a standard deviation
measure. Alternatively we could use the mean of the absolute shock impact in order to quantify the
shock impact on investment growth, which is very similar in magnitude.
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eect in block 2, the lagged eect on planned investment becomes quantitatively larger.
We furthermore conrm that agents anticipate the scal adjustment as both lead 1 and
2 show up to be signicant in all three specications. Note additionally that all control
variables (but lagged GDP in some specications) show up to be statistically signicant
with the expected sign. The R2 is low even when including rm level xed eects, which
indicates that investment changes are indeed very lumpy and volatile 29.
The forward looking behavior of the rms can be explained by the average length of
the legislative process for tax changes in Germany. To test this hypothesis we investi-
gate in a more detailed fashion the legislative timing, starting from the moment when the
draft of the law is discussed in the public (media coverage in major German newspapers
and news magazines). Therefore we search for news contents related to the discussion
of scal shock measures employing the database LexisNexis 30. In fact we nd clear evi-
dence that between the time of public discussion and publication of the law, on average,
there passes one year. Compared to the draft date, the date when the law is ocially
introduced in the parliamentary discussion, the public discussion happens around half
a year earlier. Table 1.2 in the appendix provides an overview of mayor exogenous tax
shocks since 1992 including their ocial publication dates, draft dates and periods of
public discussion in the media (discussion dates). Given these ndings, we re-estimate
our main regression model focusing on the discussion date as "true" announcement date
of the shock.
The results are reported in Table 1.7. We nd that once we consider the media dis-
cussion date, controlling for rm-level sales growth or using rm-level xed eects, no
forward lag shows up to be signicant. In fact compared to the publication date, the
scal shock is only signicantly (and negatively) correlated with changes in planned in-
vestment at impact, i.e. when the news is announced. 31 Generally, using the discussion
date, we nd quantitatively similar, but more stable eects of downward revision of -
3.5% to -4% for a shock equal to 1% value added in the manufacturing industry. A shock
29Note furthermore that the R2 from the rm level xed eect regressions, column (3) and (6) are adjusted
and hence lower than the other columns, that report an unadjusted regression t.
30LexiNexis contains all major German newspaper and covers news contents from the beginning of the
1990s.
31We also tried alternative specications including additional lags up to lag 4, but the only signicant
impact remains at lag zero.
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equal to one standard deviation hence led to a downward revision of investment plans
by 1.9% for the sample period 1993-2010.
Insert Table 1.7 here
To sum up, when rms make their plans for next period investment, they are inu-
enced by laws currently under discussion and laws published in the previous half year.
Given the fact that we are interested in identifying the announcement eect of scal
consolidation measures on planned and realized investment, we hence use the discus-
sion date as main specication in the remaining sections of this paper.
1.4.2 Realized investment
After analyzing rm behavior in terms of investment expectation, it is interesting to ap-
ply a similar analysis to realized investment in order to be able to compare our ndings
with the previous macro-level results. We consider rms’ annual investment growth
from 1970 to 2010 as dened in section 1.2. Table 1.8 presents the point estimates of
the eect of a tax change equal to 1% of total manufacturing value added on invest-
ment growth. Column (1) does not include any controls while column(2) includes ag-
gregate controls and column (3) furthermore lagged sales growth at rm level. Column
(4) presents the results for realized investment for the period 1991-2010, while column
(5) for the earlier period and Western Germany alone (1970-1990).
Insert Table 1.8 here
Interestingly, we nd that the scal shock has a negative and signicant impact on re-
alized investment that is strongest in the year of public discussion32 but has also a lagged
eect. The initial impact is stable to the inclusion of additional aggregate and rm level
controls (column 2 and 3), however once we include the set of controls, we nd a more
persistent eect. Adding up the signicant lags in column 3, the total impact of a one
percent tax shock on investment growth is around -15.6%, which however is smaller
when evaluated at the mean absolute impact or the standard deviation measure: -5.7%.
32Using as true announcement date the date of public discussion as introduced in the previous section.
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In fact, for the annual shock series, there are a total of 19 scal shocks with a mean value
of 0.0007 and a standard deviation of 0.0037. All aggregate control variables show up to
be signicant and show the expected sign. The sample split in column 4 and 5 suggests
two clearly dierent patterns: while in the more recent period 1991-2010, the scal shock
shows quantitatively the same impact as for the entire sample period (-8.8%), the earlier
subsample shows a signicant lagged eect that is biggest at lag 1. As for the half yearly
analysis there are 10 shocks for the subsample post 1991, with a mean impact of 0.00096
(0.0047) and 9 shocks for the rst subsample referring to column 5 with a mean impact
of 0.0004 (0.0027). Hence the dierent scal policy over the period considered translates
into bigger and more volatile shocks in more recent years. In addition to dierences in
the scal shock series, rms might have changed their behavior over the last 20 years,
using more technology and respond faster to changes in the companies legal and scal
environment.
Generally, the results are in line with the macro level ndings even though the magni-
tudes are not directly comparable. Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) for instance nd
that a one percent GDP tax shock has a negative and signicant lagged eect on xed
capital formation growth in Germany that increases from -4% in the rst quarter after
the adjustment to around -6% one year after the adjustment. In fact, while in the macro
literature the shock is standardized by GDP, in our micro set-up it makes more sense to
re-scale the expected budgetary impact using the value added of the total manufacturing
sector. Moreover, another dierence between our framework and the macro analysis is
the dierence in timing.
In order to verify that scal shocks, dened as exogenous, are not correlated with the
shocks that were announced in the past but implemented at time t, we reestimate our
regression model including both the previously announced shocks and in a second step
also the shocks that we classied as endogenous. Running our main specication (col-
umn (3), containing both aggregate and rm level controls), and including the shocks
previously identied as endogenous, we get results very much in line with those pre-
sented in Table 1.7. While the leads do not show up to be signicant, at impact we
estimate an eect of -7.65, at lag1 of -5.87 and at lag 2 of -2.95, all signicant at 1%33. On
33This results hold independent of the inclusion of control variables.
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the other hand, including the anticipated tax shocks, we conrm these ndings: while
the leads are not statistically signicant, at impact we estimate an eect of -8.29, at lag1
of -6.39 and at lag2 of -4.89. These ndings can be seen as a rst robustness check for
our main regression results.34
While section 1.5 reports the results for heterogeneity of realized investment changes
depending on type of tax adjustment, rm size and the sub-sector of the manufactur-
ing industry, section 1.6 performs further robustness checks, providing also evidence
for the negative and signicant eect of tax adjustments using a rigorous dierence-in-
dierence strategy that allows us controlling for other unobserved factors potentially
correlated with the scal shock series and investment growth.
1.5 Heterogeneous eects
The long time span of available data for realized investment growth allows us studying
the eect of tax changes by looking at three main dimensions: type of tax adjustment,
heterogeneous eects by rm size and by manufacturing sub-sector as well as their in-
teractions.
Looking at GDP per capita, Johansson (2008) nd that corporate taxes are most harm-
ful for growth, followed by personal income taxes and consumption taxes. To test for the
eect of exogenous tax changes on realized investment we group the shocks in dierent
categories. As depicted in Figure 1.2, we distinguish three main tax categories:
• personal income tax, pension & savings tax
• corporate & business tax, energy tax, property tax
• consumption tax
Breaking down the tax shock into these subcategories, we are able to distinguish 11
tax measures for the rst category, 11 for category two and 7 for the third category. In
34Table 1.13 presents the eects of scal consolidation at industry level, provides similar evidence. Includ-
ing previously announced shocks or shocks considered endogenous does not alter our main ndings.
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Figure 1.2: Exogenous tax adjustments; by tax type
order to identify these categories we revised a total of 42 tax law changes that consist of
184 individual tax measures.
Insert Table 1.9 here
Including the three scal shock series in our reduced form estimation, both in the same
regression (Table 1.9, column 1) and in separate regressions, we nd important dier-
ences with respect to the previous estimates found in Johansson (2008): consumption tax
shocks have a strong negative and lagged impact, while tax adjustments aecting income
tax seem to have the biggest impact within the same year. Property and corporate taxes,
on the other hand, have a smaller eect at impact. These ndings support a recent hy-
pothesis35 which highlights the importance of the demand channel for the transmission
of scal shocks. Consumption taxes aect demand and consequently rms’ investment
in the successive periods through future demand expectations.
In order to compare our results with the aggregate ndings on realized investment
(section 1.4), we look at the standard deviation measure of the distinct categories of s-
cal shocks and nd that while income (0.0021) and property (0.0022) adjustments nearly
35See for example the discussion of Aghion and Kharroubi (2013) at the annual BIS conference (June 2013)
by Reichlin.
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have the same variability, consumption shocks are smaller, almost half (0.0011). Using
the estimated coecients from column (1) this leads to an eect of a standard deviation
scal adjustment on investment growth of -4.1% for income tax, -1.76% for property tax
and -1.9% for consumption tax. In order to contrast these results, we aggregate scal
shocks in an alternative way, considering income and property tax as direct taxes and
the consumption tax as indirect taxes. Results are presented in Table 1.10 and show the
same pattern that is stable to the inclusion of additional controls, xed eects and also
to the inclusion of previously excluded tax shocks. While direct taxes show a negative
eect at impact, indirect taxes only lead to a downward revision of realized investment
in the subsequent period, and hence providing further evidence for the demand channel
hypothesis.
Recent rm-level literature has furthermore stressed the importance of considering
heterogeneous and distributional eects of scal and other policies in general. To test
for dierent impact in terms of rm size we use the IFO rm class sizes of employees (1-
49, 50-199, 200-999, >1000) and run the regression for each subgroup separately. Given
the potential residual correlation across size classes, we adopted a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) framework. The results highlighted in Figure 1.3 show that at impact
all size classes are negatively and signicantly aected by the tax adjustment. Further-
more the eects are larger for rms that belong to size group 1 to 3. The largest rms
show the smallest coecient. Moreover we conrm that the lagged eect is present for
all size classes but for the smallest rms (size group 1), where lag1 does not show up
to be signicant. This nding might be due to the fact that the smallest group is highly
heterogeneous, as it is also suggested by the wide condence band. The magnitude of
the eect is in line with the aggregate ndings for the impact and slightly larger for lag1.
In a next step, we investigate if distinct tax shocks have dierent eects by rm size.
The tax eects might dier as rm size can be also seen as a proxy for legal status. Figure
1.4 shows the results for direct and indirect tax shocks at impact and for lag1 for the dis-
tinct size groups. As pointed out above, given the strong heterogeneity in the smallest
size group, we cannot conrm any signicant eect for either tax category. On the other
hand we do conrm the main pattern that we found when looking at type of tax shocks.
Direct tax adjustments have a negative impact at lag 0 that is quantitatively smaller than
the impact for indirect (consumption) taxes at lag 1. Furthermore the impact is larger for
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smaller rms (coecient for size group 2 > size 3 > size 4, for both direct and indirect
taxes), which might indicate that smaller rms are on average more credit constraint
and hence a scal shock translates to a stronger eect (see Zwick and Mahon (Working
Paper) for recent evidence from the US).
A nal dimension of heterogeneity that we test is the response by sub-sectors of the
manufacturing industry. For that purpose, we divide the rms in our sample into 12
sub-sectors based on the two-digit ISIC 3 classication with some aggregations36. We
apply the same SUR methodology as used for rm size, and regress investment growth
on contemporaneous and lagged scal shocks, including furthermore our set of control
variables. The results for lag 0 are displayed in Figure 1.5 37. We nd that almost all
sub-sectors show a negative and signicant impact at lag 0, but the sub-sectors "food,
beverages & tobacco", "leather", "non-metallic mineral products", and "transport equip-
ment"38. The signicant coecients range from -5 to -11 and are hence in line with our
previous ndings.
Using the narrative identication for scal shocks allows us considering and aggre-
gating a wide range of shocks, and thus identifying a robust average eect of tax ad-
justments; however, at the same time, and given the shock heterogeneity, the narrative
approach makes it dicult to pin down a single channel.
36The manufacturing industries covered are food, beverages and tobacco (1516), textiles and wearing ap-
parel (1718), Leather industry (1900), wood (2000), pulp, paper and printing (2122), chemical, rubber,
plastics and fuel products (2325), other non-metallic mineral products (2600), basic metals and fabri-
cated metal products (2728), machinery and equipment n.e.c. (2900), machinery and equipment (3033),
transport equipment (3435) and manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling (3637).
37For lag one we only nd a signicant (and negative) eect for sub-sectors 1718, 2122, 2900, and 3033.
38While "food, beverages & tobacco" are a very heterogeneous group of rms, "leather" and "non-metallic
mineral products" are very small and specialized sub-sectors within the German manufacturing indus-
try. The fact that we do not nd a signicant eect for the transport equipment sector might be related
to the strong export orientation of this sub sector, which includes the entire German car industry.
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Figure 1.3: Heterogeneous eect by rm class size
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Figure 1.4: Heterogeneous eect by size and tax type
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Figure 1.5: Heterogeneous eect by ISIC sector classication: at impact
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1.6 Robustness
1.6.1 Sensitivity analysis
In addition to the rst model checks presented in the main section, we further elaborate
on robustness in the present section. First, given the strong impact that the recent -
nancial and economic crisis had on the economic activity in Germany (negative changes
in realized investment of around 30 % in 2009 alone), a rst sensitivity check consists of
excluding the period 2007-2010 from our analysis. As pointed out in the methodological
section, in the original regression specication we already control with a dummy for
the recent crisis period, however excluding the period completely represents a good ro-
bustness check for our ndings. Dropping the period post 2007, we are left with 38,950
observations. For our preferred regression specication, including both aggregate and
rm-level controls we nd that the leads are not predictable and that the estimated co-
ecients for the scal shocks show the same sign and magnitude as before: -8.76, -5.54,
and -3.05 for lag 0 to lag 2.
Another important robustness check is to exclude the biggest single sub-sector within
manufacturing (manufacture of machinery and equipment) and to see if our results are
stable. Dropping 17,710 observations from the annual dataset does not aect our re-
sults to an important degree and the estimated coecients are directly aligned with our
analysis of annual realized investment changes: -7.99, -4.21, and -2.96 for lag 0 to lag 2.
Moreover, given the potential concern that structural shocks dier from consolidation
shocks in their nature, i.e. they are based on "structural" considerations, these shocks
might be correlated to past output and investment levels. We hence exclude them from
our regression analysis and re-estimate the model using only shocks that are labeled
unambiguously consolidation shocks in both Uhl (2013) and our classication. Again,
our results are strongly aligned with the ones presented previously.
Finally, and in order to follow the literature on rm level investment, we model rm
investment as in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005). We hence estimate a dynamic
model of rm investment focusing on the investment rate rather than on investment
growth 39. Due to data availably, we normalize investment by average assets of the com-
39The interested reader is referred to Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005), where the error correction
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pany rather than by the capital stock at time t− 1. The investment model species that
current investment, the dependent variable, is explained by lagged investment, current
and lagged sales growth, levels of sales, current and lagged cash ow to capital ratio and
the second lag of the dierence between capital stock and sales (k−y). As explained in
Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005), for consistency with the error correction speci-
cation, we require the coecient of (k−y) to be negative. For stability we furthermore
require that the coecient of lagged investment is lower than one in absolute terms.
As the investment rate depends on investment in the previous period, the model has
to be estimated by general method of moments (GMM) 40. Given the fact that the GMM
estimator is a large N, small T estimator, we focus on the sample period 1991 to 2004
in order to maximize the numbers of tax shocks and rm observations, but repeat the
exercise for the full sample with very similar ndings. In a rst step, we estimate the
model as in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005), including time xed eects, in or-
der to account for the economic cycle and other unobserved factors (Table 1.11, column
1). In order to estimate the eect of our annualized scal shocks, we replace the time
xed eects by aggregate controls (column 2) and conrm that the main results do not
change. Finally, the scal shock is included in column (3). Similar to our previous nd-
ings on investment growth, we nd a negative and signicant eect for scal shocks on
the investment rate at impact and lag1. The coecients can be interpreted as a 1% tax ad-
justment in terms of VA in the manufacturing industry leads to a decrease in investment
by -1.4% at impact and -1.1% at lag one, and hence a total aggregate eect of -2.5%. The
test statistics for column 3 indicate that the Hansen-statistic of non-valid instruments
can be rejected, while the model shows clear evidence of autocorrelation only at lag1.41.
model of rm investment is derived in detail.
40For eciency considerations, we adopt the system GMM approach as in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen
(2005)
41As additional model check we ignore the potential correlation between lagged investment and the error
term and estimate the investment equation by both OLS and xed eect regression. Given the induced
bias the true value for lagged investment should be in-between the two naive approaches. We nd that
his is the case with an OLS estimate of 0.45 and FE estimate of 0.09 for the lagged investment coecient.
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1.6.2 Towards a causal interpretation
Using a narrative identication strategy for scal shocks should overcome any type of
endogeneity by construction. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the micro-level dataset
and the detailed shock breakdown, we can provide further evidence that the investment
response is indeed driven by the scal shock and that there are no unobserved factors
driving the investment response, using a dierence-in-dierence approach. In order to
do so, we focus on one specic type of shock that is likely to aect only some sub-sectors
of the manufacturing industry. This identication strategy can help us to get closer to a
causal interpretation of investment impact of scal consolidation.
For this purpose, we focus on tax changes that aect the cost of energy. Our assump-
tion is that controlling for a set of aggregate and rm level factors, some energy intensive
sectors will be highly aected by this type of tax adjustment, while other sectors will
not respond to this tax change. Key is that both sectors, belonging to the manufactur-
ing industry, share the same unobserved trends and hence any dierence in outcome
can be assigned to the eect of the tax shock. The pulp and paper industry seems a
good candidate to test this hypothesis, given its high energy dependence42. As control
groups we consider the food and tobacco industry (ISIC 1516) and the group of non-
classied manufacturing (ISIC 3637). Even though some rms in the food and tobacco
industry might be dependent on energy in their production process, both control sectors
are highly heterogeneous in terms of products and production processes and hence it is
likely for energy tax changes not to show any aggregate eect.
Our "treatment" group "paper" consists of 10,357 observations and the combined group
of "controls" has a total of 10,946 observations for the sample period 1970-2010. For this
period we count a total of 4 energy shocks43. Investment change for the entire sam-
ple period for the control group has a mean value of -0.012 (1.01) and for the treatment
group 0.001 (1.36). The regression results are reported in Table 1.12, where the rst col-
42On a worldwide scale the pulp and paper industry is considered the fth largest consumer of energy.
One additional advantage of the pulp and paper industry is that the products and manufacturing pro-
cesses are highly standardized and hence a shock on energy prices (tax increase) is likely to aect all
companies in the industry in a very similar fashion.
43Shocks in 1972, 1980, 1987 and 2001. Given the small number of shocks, we focus on realized investment
changes rather than updates in planned investment.
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umn (1) refers to a pooled regression, column (2) includes xed eects for the individual
sub-branches summarized in the two categories, and column (3) includes rm level xed
eects. The results show that there exists a strong negative lagged eect for pulp and
paper, while the control sector does not show any signicant response to energy tax
increases. Adding rm level xed eects in column (3) alters the estimated coecients
only slightly, but leads to a higher level of signicance for lag 1. In order to compare the
magnitude of the coecients with our previous ndings, we evaluate them at the mean
impact of energy shocks. Given a standard deviation of energy shocks of 0.002, rms in
the pulp and paper industry respond to an average shock by reducing their investment
growth by -4.8%. The results are hence highly aligned with our previous ndings.
1.7 Conclusion
Private investment has been shown to be one of the main drivers of aggregate output
during periods of scal consolidation. Nevertheless, previous literature has failed to pro-
vide a causal link between scal adjustment, business condence and rm investment.
The urge for understanding this channel is even more relevant in periods of excessive
debt and/or decit when the economy needs an eective growth policy agenda.
Based on a detailed narrative record for tax changes in Germany ( Uhl (2013)), we
reclassify 40 years of scal shocks into "exogenous" and "endogenous" changes with
respect to investment and to the contingent state of the economy. Exploiting this ex-
ogenous variation, we study the eect of a tax change on rms’ realized and planned
investment, considering the IFO investment survey dataset. We nd that recently pub-
lished laws and laws under current discussion in the media and in the parliament shape
future investment plans. Taking into account the forward looking behavior and adjust-
ing the announcement dates according, we nd that an increase in tax equal to 1% of the
value added of the total manufacturing industry leads to a lagged decrease in planned
investment of about 4%. For realized investment growth we estimate an average eect
of 8%
Finally, the use of micro-level rm data allows us to elaborate further on heterogene-
ity in terms of rm size, industry sub sector as well as by type of tax shock. Dierently
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from the previous literature, we nd that consumption taxes and income tax adjustments
are most harmful for growth as they have the strongest negative and persistent eect
on investment growth at rm level. The nding thus support recent hypotheses that
highlight the importance of the demand channel in the transmission of scal policies,
and may act through future demand expectation.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Narrative & firm investment data
This section shows some examples of tax changes as discussed and classied in Uhl
(2013). For our purpose of analyzing the eect of exogenous scal tax changes on in-
vestment we revise all structural and consolidation tax measures in Uhl and reclassify
them accordingly in "endogenous" and "exogenous" measures.
An example for an exogenous structural tax measure is given by shock number 20 in
Uhl (2013) ,"Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der oekologischen Steuerreform". It corresponds
to the continuation of the ecological tax reform, published on 22 December 1999, with
a total budgetary impact of 10,635 billion Euros it represents a tax measure with struc-
tural motivation that is included in our analysis. Even though the revenues from the
original ecological tax reform were aimed at reforming the retirement scheme in Ger-
many from a pure pay-as-you go system to a more capital oriented system (the so-called
"Riester Rente"), and hence might have indirect impact on investment, the continuation
law discussed here did not directly contribute to the structural reform of the pension
scheme, and revenues were not used to reduce the contribution rates to the social secu-
rity system. The main argument that dominated the parliamentary debate was that that
additional block grants were used to avoid future increases. We label the tax measure
structural and include it in our analysis.
On the contrary, shock number 28 in Uhl (2013) " Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersaetze
und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung", represents a good example of structural
shock that we consider endogenous, dierently from Uhl (2013) . It refers to a law that
has the objective to decrease taxes and reform company taxation (published in October
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Figure 1.6: Timing of the half-yearly investment survey
2000). This law implemented one of the most extensive tax reforms in Germany and
substantially reduced income - and corporate tax burden. Furthermore the corporate
tax imputation system was replaced by a 50 percent income taxation rule. The intro-
duction of the bill clearly postulated that the motivation behind the law is to promote
growth and employment by reducing the tax burden. Tax reductions were supposed to
stimulate consumption, employment and investment. Therefore we do not included it
in our analysis as it is directly aimed at increasing rm investment activity.
Finally, a good example for a consolidation shock is given by shock number 62 in
Uhl (2013), a law published in March 1981, with the objective to increase petroleum
tax and taxes on spirits (Mineraloel und Branntweinsteuer-Aenderungsgesetz 1981). As
pointed out in Uhl (2013), the main motivation behind the law was budgetary consoli-
dation. Although structural eects cannot be excluded completely (in order to improve
the structure of tax revenues), consolidation considerations dominated the discussion.
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1.8.2 Summary statistics
This section presents evidence for the representativeness of our sample data for the over-
all manufacturing sector in Germany. We compare aggregate rm level data, obtained
as log dierence of total change at time t and time t-1 (d_inv_t) and a size-weighted
average measure of investment changes (d_inv_a_w), with the benchmark for realized
investment changes (gross xed capital formation data obtained from STAN Industry
Rev.3 2008 (OECD).
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 present results from the aggregate VAR analysis and provide
evidence that the shock series cannot be predicted by macroeconomic variables or lagged
investment changes. On the other hand, all announced shocks at time t seem to have an
impact on changes in investment (Table 1.4); the null hypothesis of no granger causality
can be rejected at the 10% signicance level.
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Figure 1.7: Change in aggregate investment: STAN vs. sample aggregation
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Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob4>4chi2 Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob4>4chi2
Exog.4fiscal4shock Interest4rate4(3month) 0.003 1 0.959 Endog.4fiscal4shock Interest4rate4(3month) 2.572 1 0.109
Exog.4fiscal4shock GDP4growth 0.689 1 0.407 Endog.4fiscal4shock GDP4growth 3.447 1 0.063
Exog.4fiscal4shock Change4in4investment 0.172 1 0.678 Endog.4fiscal4shock Change4in4investment 2.141 1 0.143
Exog.4fiscal4shock ALL 1.461 3 0.691 Endog.4fiscal4shock ALL 6.283 3 0.099
D.investment Exog.4fiscal4shock 0.020 1 0.887 D.investment Endog.4fiscal4shock 0.297 1 0.586
D.investment Interest4rate4(3month) 1.426 1 0.232 D.investment Interest4rate4(3month) 1.040 1 0.308
D.investment GDP4growth 1.620 1 0.203 D.investment GDP4growth 1.964 1 0.161
D.investment ALL 2.732 3 0.435 D.investment ALL 3.028 3 0.387
Exogenous4fiscal4shock4and4investment4change4(394obs.) Endogenous4fiscal4shock4and4investment4change4(394obs.)
Table 1.3: Granger causality test based on 4 variable VAR
1.8.3 Regression tables
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Dependent'variable:'Exogenous'fiscal'shock Dependent'variable:'Endogenous'fiscal'shock
beta se beta se
L.1'Change'in'investment >2.626 (2.108) L.1'Change'in'investment >0.335 (>2.005)
L.2'Change'in'investment 1.670 (1.942) L.2'Change'in'investment '''''4.766** (>2.099)
L.1'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.1'GDP 0.000 (0.000)
L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000)
Observations 39 Observations 39
Pseudo'R2 0.06 Pseudo'R2 0.09
For'the'sample'period'1970>2010'there'are'6'negative For'the'sample'period'1970>2010'there'are'14'negative
adjustment,'25'periods'of'no'action'and'10'years adjustment,'15'periods'of'no'action'and'12'years
with'positive'shocks. with'positive'shocks.
Table 1.4: Ordered Probit: Insample
Dependent'variable:'Exogenous'fiscal'shock Dependent'variable:'Endogenous'fiscal'shock
beta se beta se
L.1'GFCF ?2.93E?11 (7.81e?11) L.1'GFCF 1.82E?10** (8.15E?11)
L.2'GFCF 5.03E?11 (6.73e?11) L.2'GFCF ?7.13E?11 (6.71E?11)
L.1'GDP ?.000 (0.000) L.1'GDP ?0.002** (0.001)
L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.2'GDP 0.001** (0.001)
Observations 38 Observations 38
Pseudo'R2 0.05 Pseudo'R2 0.12
For'the'sample'period'1970?2010'there'are'6'negative For'the'sample'period'1970?2010'there'are'14'negative
adjustment,'25'periods'of'no'action'and'10'years adjustment,'15'periods'of'no'action'and'12'years
with'positive'shocks. with'positive'shocks.
Table 1.5: Ordered Probit: Ocial Statistics (OECD STAN)
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Table 1.7: Halfyearly: discussion date of the scal shock
Dependent variable:
Revision in planned investment (1) (2) (3)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
F2.scal shock –4.831** –3.149 –3.268
(2.452) (2.551) (2.645)
F.scal shock 1.566 1.632 0.933
(2.265) (2.287) (2.406)
Fiscal shock –4.132*** –3.418** –3.941**
(1.498) (1.565) (1.590)
L.scal shock –1.548 –1.736 –1.810
(1.510) (1.564) (1.651)
L2.scal shock –1.910 –0.813 –1.012
(1.816) (1.888) (1.892)
Dummy_autumn 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.085***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.116*** –0.100*** –0.097***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
L.GDP 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.017** –0.018** –0.020*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
L.Sales growth 0.095*** 0.056*
(0.028) (0.032)
Observations 23151 19525 19525
R2 0.007 0.008 0.006
Industry FE Y Y N
Firm FE N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in
parentheses.
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Table 1.8: Annual: realized investment change
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
F2.scal shock 2.659*** 1.239 0.584 2.126* 3.085
(0.922) (0.940) (0.945) (1.150) (2.022)
F.scal shock 0.895 0.056 –0.020 0.642 4.563**
(0.896) (0.904) (0.910) (1.208) (1.923)
Fiscal shock –8.949*** –8.502*** –8.724*** –8.789*** –2.359
(0.952) (0.960) (0.960) (1.245) (1.811)
L.scal shock –2.901*** –4.682*** –4.853*** –1.704 –7.072***
(0.849) (0.876) (0.883) (1.056) (1.824)
L2.scal shock 0.858 –1.757* –2.164** 0.529 –3.275*
(0.941) (0.986) (0.993) (1.248) (1.895)
Dummy_90 –0.270*** –0.276***
(0.018) (0.018)
Dummy_crisis –0.098*** –0.097*** 0.065
(0.032) (0.036) (0.051)
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** –0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.028*** –0.028*** –0.047*** –0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005)
L.Sales growth 0.032 0.053 0.000
(0.031) (0.034) (0.056)
Observations 43738 43738 42046 23024 19022
R2 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.013
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in parentheses.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous eects: Tax type
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
Income tax –13.956*** –18.096***
(2.298) (1.925)
L.Income tax –5.670** –5.808***
(2.403) (1.963)
Property and Corp tax –7.958*** –12.959***
(2.052) (1.575)
L.Property and Corp tax 0.947 –6.606***
(2.037) (1.474)
Consumption tax 0.176 –6.754***
(2.998) (2.533)
L.Consumption tax –17.392*** –17.800***
(3.044) (2.550)
Dummy_90 –0.225*** –0.213*** –0.239*** –0.191***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.227*** –0.207*** –0.240*** –0.216***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.023*** –0.026*** –0.027*** –0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
L.Sales growth –0.002 –0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 54261 54261 54261 54261
R2 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in paren-
theses.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous eects: direct vs. indirect taxes
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
Direct taxes –9.720*** –10.228*** –9.869***
(1.086) (1.114) (1.102)
L.Direct taxes –0.906 –1.641 –0.959
(1.081) (1.106) (1.087)
Indirect taxes 3.054 2.449 3.298
(3.053) (3.097) (3.160)
L.Indirect taxes –16.265*** –15.903*** –16.055***
(2.778) (2.822) (2.844)
Observations 53164 53164 53164
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Controls Y Y Y
Anticipated shocks N N Y
Industry FE Y N Y
Firm FE N Y N
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at
rm level in parentheses.
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Table 1.11: Results from GMM Model (Bond et. al (2003))
Dependent variable:
Investment / Assets (1) (2) (3)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
L. Investment / Assets 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.236***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Sales growth 0.294*** 0.256*** 0.254***
(0.088) (0.081) (0.111)
L.Sales growth 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.153***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.030)
L2.(Assets - Sales) –0.103*** –0.100*** –0.124***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.030)
F.scal shock –0.094
(1.001)
Fiscal shock –1.461**
(0.681)
L.scal shock –1.101*
(0.665)
Hansen (p-value) 0.01 0.05 0.13
Arellano-Bond (AR1) -17.34 -17.72 -15.91
Arellano-Bond (AR2) 1.67 1.75 1.76
Observations 10761 10761 9524
Firms 1875 1875 1798
Year FE Y N N
Aggregate controls N Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation by SYS-GMM using
the one-step estimator. Hansen test (p-value) for over identi-
cation restrictions reported. We follow the same selection of
instruments as in Bond et. al (2003)
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Table 1.12: Results from Di-in-Di: Energy tax
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3)
(β / (SE) (β / (SE) (β / (SE)
Energy tax X paper industry 3.608 3.410 6.921
(13.553) (13.554) (14.011)
L.Energy tax X paper industry –23.134* –23.532* –24.323**
(12.269) (12.272) (12.289)
L2.Energy tax X paper industry –20.403 –20.356 –20.427
(12.683) (12.697) (13.105)
Energy tax –1.535 –1.517 –3.133
(8.436) (8.435) (8.806)
L.Energy tax 4.927 5.158 4.569
(7.952) (7.958) (7.972)
L2.Energy tax –10.747 –10.927 –12.773
(9.005) (9.020) (9.230)
Pulp & Paper 0.039***
(0.013)
Observations 12960 12960 12960
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004
Controls Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y N
Firm FE N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in
parentheses.
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Table 1.13: Aggretated results: by ISIC 3 subsector
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
Fiscal shock –3.689*** –3.689*** –2.301* –2.278**
(1.120) (0.816) (1.054) (0.864)
L.scal shock –2.674** –2.682*** –2.279** –2.958***
(1.182) (0.760) (0.772) (0.740)
L2.scal shock –.635 –0.640 –1.091 –1.493
(1.557) (2.124) (2.065) (2.021)
Fiscal shock anticipated –0.018
(0.689)
L.scal shock anticipated 0.181
(0.421)
L2.scal shock anticipated 2.011*
(0.989)
Fiscal shock endog. 1.209*
(0.649)
L.scal shock endog. –1.129
(0.679)
L2.scal shock endog. –3.316***
(0.589)
Dummy_90 –0.248*** –0.249*** –0.253*** –0.202***
(0.0402) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038)
Dummy_crisis –0.151*** –0.151*** –0.176*** –0.1678***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.046) (0.034)
L.GDP_index 0.696*** 0.697*** 0.689*** 0.589***
(0.135) (0.101) (0.097) (0.122)
L.3 month interbank rate –.0171*** –0.171*** –0.0183*** –0.011*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 465 465 465 465
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.16
Industry FE N Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
Projection bias inhousehold investment?
The case of solar photovoltaics in Ger-
many.
2.1 Introduction
Core theory in economics builds on a simple but powerful model of behavior ( DellaVi-
gna (2009)). The neoclassical theory hence assumes that decision makers are fully ratio-
nal, incorporate all available information, and base their decisions on expected returns.
However, general evidence from psychology suggests that this is not always the case.
When optimal decision-making includes a prediction of future tastes, it seems that al-
though people understand qualitatively how tastes change over time, they systematically
underestimate the magnitudes of such changes. Behavioral economists developed the-
ories that could explain such deviation from the classical rational utility maximizers.1
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) show with a simple model in which op-
timal decision-making depends on the correct anticipation of future tastes, that when
future tastes might dier from current ones due to habit formation, mood uctuations,
social inuences, or changes in the exogenous environment, Projection bias can lead to
dynamic inconsistency. They furthermore show that Projection bias can be especially
important in the context of durable good buying decisions and irreversible investment
where it can lead to misguided (impulse) purchases.
When Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) formally introduce the framework
of Projection bias to the economic literature, most evidence was based on experiments
and so far only a limited number of economic studies exploits eld data to look at this
potentially important phenomenon. Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang (2007) look at
1A detailed discussion for the psychological evidence of Projection bias is provided by Loewenstein and
Schkade (1999).
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Projection bias in catalogue orders of cold-weather items and nd that people’s choices
are over-inuenced by the weather at the time they make decisions. In addition to re-
duced form estimates, they provide a structural model to measure the magnitude of the
bias and nd it to be rather important. Simonsohn (2010) on the other hand provides
eld evidence for the student’s decision to enroll to college. Documenting the evidence
that cloudiness increases the appeal of academic activities, he nds that an increase in
cloud-cover of one standard deviation on the day of the campus visit is associated with
an increase in the probability of enrollment of 9 percentage points. In a recent work-
ing paper Busse, Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso (2012) nd further evidence of Projection
bias in two important consumer markets: the car and housing market in the U.S. The au-
thors analyze how weather impacts consumer’s purchasing decision and show that sales
for 4-wheel-drives and convertibles are highly inuenced by idiosyncratic variation in
weather variables. Furthermore, using hedonic house price models they nd evidence
that certain house characteristics are valued dierently throughout the year2.
This paper investigates the presence of Projection bias in the context of an irreversible
household investment decision: the decision to install solar PV. Given the threat of cli-
mate change, European policy makers (and most OECD countries) agree that large in-
vestment in renewable energy sources is necessary. Germany is taking a pioneer role
in this transition process with the so called "Energiewende"3, a key policy concern for
coming decades. Resulting support policies for renewables have made the installation of
solar PV an interesting investment opportunity for households.4 I investigate if house-
hold investment decisions are over-inuenced by short-lived weather phenomena such
as an exceptionally sunny month. Finding evidence of Projection bias in an important
household investment decision could have implications for other consumer choices (see
2Other papers providing evidence on Projection bias are Mehra and Sah (2002) and Grable, Lytton, and
O’Neill (2004), where Projection bias is however linked to mood uctuations. Alternative interpreta-
tions for deviations from rational choice are consumer myopia (see for example Busse, Knittel, and
Zettelmeyer (2013) for a recent contribution) or habit formation.
3The Energiewende, is one of the key concerns for German policy in the current legislative. In 2011
the goal has been approved to reduce long-term greenhouse gases by 80-95%, to establish renewable
energy targets of 60%, and to increase energy eciency by 50% by 2050.
4The German renewable energy act, EEG for its letters in German, provides households with xed "feed-
in taris" that allow long-term planning security and above market returns for solar PV plants. The
institutional features of the market for solar PV are discussed in detail in section 2.3.
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Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) and Busse, Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso
(2012)), the policy maker should be aware of. The present paper makes three main con-
tributions to the literature.
First, given the nancial commitment, planning and installation horizon together with
the information cost, the investment choice in solar PV can be clearly labeled a high stake
decision. Second, my research design tackles the potential relevant Projection bias in an
environment where weather (sunshine) can be linked to utility through nancial returns,
as sunshine is a direct input to electricity production and hence expected returns. Third,
given the political importance of solar PV diusion, this paper contributes to the policy
discussion by testing if household choices are aected by short-lived weather phenom-
ena, and hence gives further insights, how targeted information campaigns might help
to reduce the cost of technology promotion and to achieve a fast uptake, e.g. testing
for heterogeneous eects, I conrm that certain political groups are more preceptive to
Projection bias5.
Using exogenous variation in sunshine hours, I estimate the causal eect of sunshine
and other weather shocks on the household investment decision in solar PV. In order to
do so, I create a unique dataset, merging the universe of all registered household solar PV
installations in Germany with highly precise weather information for the period 2000-
2008. The ocial data for sunshine hours and temperature are available on a km-by-km
grid, which allows me to identify the impact of weather shocks at the county-month
level. My identication takes furthermore advantage of the fact that the average time of
installation in Germany is 5-8 weeks and hence current weather does not aect directly
the protability of the investment decision. The results indicate that Projection bias is
potentially an important factor for household investment in solar technology. For the
period 2000-08, a sunshine realization one standard deviation above the long-term aver-
age in a given county-month leads to approximately 0.5 additional installations, which
represents an increase of 8% when evaluated at the sample mean. This increase is not
driven by displacement (harvesting), but I nd a lasting eect which is furthermore ro-
bust to shock denition and model specication.
5For a recent contribution on the impact of political orientation on environmental behavior see Costa
and Kahn (2013).
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For the full sample, I test as well for temperature shocks, which do not have any sig-
nicant eect. I furthermore perform robustness checks employing a reduced sample of
62 weather stations, for which I can observe additional weather covariates such as rain
and snow as well as data at higher frequencies. The reduced sample conrms my main
ndings, however only at the monthly level. Weekly sunshine shocks do not seem to
have a signicant impact on the uptake behavior of households, which could be a result
of the noisiness of weekly weather patterns. Finally, I conrm that there exists important
heterogeneity for Projection bias which can be linked to political ideology. As pointed
out in a recent paper by Costa and Kahn (2013), political ideology can have an important
impact on non-market mechanisms to reduce (electricity) consumption. Using county
data from federal elections outcome, I conrm that counties in which the green party
had their strongest results in the federal elections 2002 and 2005, are inuenced more by
extreme sunshine outliers.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I introduce the theoretical frame-
work of Projection bias as developed by Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) to
the extent relevant for the purpose of this analysis. Section 2.3 describes the institutional
features of the German market for solar PV and shows how climate and weather phe-
nomena aect the protability of solar PV plants. Section 2.4 introduces the data used
for the analysis of this paper while section 2.5 presents the empirical strategy and the
main results. Section 2.6 elaborates further on robustness. Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 A theoretical framework for Projection Bias
Based on experiments and previous studies (see for instance Loewenstein and Adler
(1995)), Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) introduce formally the theory of
Projection bias to the economic literature. They give evidence that individuals tend to
mispredict their future sequence of preferences in a sense that they systematically ex-
aggerate how future tastes resemble present tastes. Projection bias can have important
implications in the case of durable goods purchase, with multiple buying opportunities
and irreversibility. This section follows closely Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
(2003) and shows how Projection bias can be seen as the main inuencing channel when
it comes to the question what triggers the investment decision in a solar PV plant.
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Suppose that a person’s instantaneous utility can be written as u(c, s), where c is
consumption good and s is the state that parameterizes the tastes of the decision maker.
In case of a Simple Projection bias, people with current state s ′ form linear expectations
about their future utility in state s. Thus, the person’s predicted utility lies in between
the true future tastes u(c, s) and the current tastes u(c, s ′)which implies that a person’s
behavior needs not to correspond to correct inter-temporal utility maximization6.
In the specic case of durable good purchases, suppose furthermore that a person’s
valuation in period t is given by a random variable µt, which is identically and inde-
pendently distributed across periods and has a nite sample mean µ. The realization
of µt is known at the beginning of the period and the durable good lasts M months 7.
Finally, the good is not consumed in the month of purchase. If a person decides to buy at
period 1, she obtains utility from the purchase, but has to pay price P which implies that
she foregoes consumption of the other goods. Assume that the utility for the durable
good is additively separable from utility of other goods and the current state is equal to
the random variable, st = µt. Then, in a one-time buying decision, the true expected
inter-temporal utility is given by:
E1[U1] = E1[
M∑
k=1
µ1+k − P] =Mµ− P
While in the presence of Projection bias we have that
E1[U˜1] = E1[
M∑
k=1
[(1− α)µ1+k + αµ1] − P] =Mµ+ αM(µ1 − µ) − P
Clearly µ1 > µ implies E1[U˜1] > E1[U1] and vice versa. Thus if the period 1 valua-
tion is larger than the average and the consumer predicts this into the future, she will be
6 Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) hence dene simple projection bias as: u˜(c, s|s ′) =
(1 − α)u(c, s) + αu(c, s ′), where α measures the degree of Projection bias, i.e. α = 0 implies cor-
rect prediction of future utility and α = 1 implies fully myopic habits.
7 Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) assume D days, however given the time horizon of the
investment in solar PV, M months seem more reasonable. Furthermore, for simplicity reasons they
assume that there is no discounting of future utilities; the results do not depend on this assumption.
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prone to overvaluation of the durable, or in other words, the persons buying decision is
too sensitive to the valuation at the purchasing time.
In the more realistic case of multiple buying decisions, the consumer can buy at most
once in any period t  {1,2,...}. A rational person would buy the good in period 1 or never,
i.e. she buys if and only ifMµ− P > 0.8 In the case of solar PV, given the average time
it takes from the decision to invest to complete the installation, the solar plant is not
functional in the month of purchase and the net expected value of investment is hence
independent of the valuation of the day (month) of purchase. On the other hand, a person
with Projection bias similarly would like to buy immediately or not at all, however her
buying decision is inuenced by her current valuation. Then a high valuation µH > µ,
implies that Mµ + αM(µH − µ) − P > 0, or in other words, Projection bias can lead
to overbuying. The person always buys when she should buy and sometimes when she
should not buy. In the case where the buying decision is highly irreversible, as in the
case of a solar plant, Projection bias can lead to impulse purchases.9
2.3 Institutional features of the market under
consideration
2.3.1 The market for solar PV in Germany
By the end of 200910, the German market for solar PV represented 52% of the total world
market11. The success of solar energy in Germany has been widely attributed to the in-
troduction of the renewable energy source act (EEG, for its letters in German) and the
related FIT support scheme in 2000. However even before the introduction of the re-
newable energy source act, renewable energy was supported by the so called ’Stromein-
8In the case of solar PV, the setup is slightly more complicated as in the dynamic setting the consumer has
to form expectations on the evolution of the feed-in tari, the technology cost (including capital cost)
and technology improvements. Furthermore the discount rate and knowledge about the technology
play an important role that are not considered here.
9As pointed out in Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003), another possible explanation for over-
consumption is hyperbolic discounting, which however is more likely in the case of repeated con-
sumption purchasing decisions.
10This subsection follows closely Jacobs (2012)
11European Photovoltaic Association
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speisungsgesetz’, in force since 1991. This act was focused on the integration of smaller
power plants, mainly hydroelectric, into the electricity grid. Only the introduction of
the EEG, together with the so called 100,000 roof program that provided investors with
subsidized loans led to an initial boom in solar. Figure 2.1 shows the number of newly
added household installations per year as well as the cumulative uptake of small scale
solar PV installations in Germany over the period 2000-2011.
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Figure 2.1: New solar PV household installations in Germany
The German FIT guarantees investors access to the electricity grid for a period of 20
years and a xed remuneration for every unit of electricity produced and sold to the
network. In order to account for technological cost-decrease and adoption behavior, the
legislator additionally introduced an annual degression rate of 5%, which applies for new
installations only. The initial EEG was limited to a total amount of new solar PV capacity
of 350 Mega Watt Peak (installed nominal capacity), which however was reached by 2003.
In order to provide also new installations with the FIT scheme, the federal government
acted in late 2003 and introduced the interim law for PV (Photovoltaik Vorschaltgesetz),
the rst reform of the EEG enacted in January 2004.
Annual degression rates have been kept stable at 5% until the introduction of the re-
vised version of the EEG in 2009. This reform brought several changes for new solar
PV installations: First, the lawmaker decided to introduce a so called sliding degres-
sion, i.e. if the total amount of newly installed capacity is above a predicted corridor,
the guaranteed taris will be reduced further in the following year. This measure was
mainly introduced to deal with the massive costs related to the FIT support schemes.
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This change in policy is important, as it can lead to higher variability in the invest-
ment decision. If households observe that total added capacity is close to the maximum
amount for a given year, this policy might lead to a run on installations and hence can
have potentially an important impact on the decision when to invest. Second, the EEG
2009 gave new incentives to use electricity generated at home locally and not to sell o
the full amount to the network. In the rst years, only few solar panel owners decided to
make use of this possibility, which however changed importantly in more recent years.
The reform of the EEG in 2009 hence represents a structural break in the FIT support
policies and I reduce my sample to the period 2000-08 in order to have comparable in-
vestment incentives across time.
Furthermore as shown in Figure 2.2, the prices for solar modules continued to de-
crease sharply from 2009 onwards. In 2009 alone prices fell by more than 30% which led
to three tari reductions in 2010 (January, July and October) and a very volatile demand
response. The last revision of the EEG has taken place in June 2011, to be implemented
in January 2012. Given the cost development of the EEG surcharge, the new law cut
importantly the incentives for solar PV and puts more emphasize on self-consumption
and electricity storage.
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Figure 2.2: FIT, Price of solar module and aggregate installations
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2.3.2 How does weather aect the profitability of solar PV?
As pointed out in King, Boyson, and Kratochvil (2002), energy produced by a photo-
voltaic module is directly related to the availability of solar energy and is hence site de-
pendent, but can be inuenced by the module’s orientation relative to the sun. Annual
solar radiation in Germany typically lies between 950 kwh and 1150 kwh per square
meter and is generally higher in the southern German regions of Bavaria and Baden-
Wuerttemberg 12. Given average sunshine radiation and FIT support policies, solar pan-
els are protable all over Germany.
Temperature on the other hand can aect the performance of the cells negatively. Both
the electrical current generated and its voltage are inuenced by the operating tempera-
ture: an increase in temperature leads typically to a decrease in voltage and an increase
in current. However the change in current is not as great as the change in voltage and
given the fact that the solar module is made up of a number of cells connected in se-
ries, the output voltage decrease due to temperature may become signicant 13. Cell’s
performance in laboratory are typically measured at a cell temperature of 25 degrees
Celsius, thus a module’s performance will decrease where cell temperature is above that
reference measure. This means that hot days in the summer month can lead to less elec-
tricity production. However generally speaking for Germany temperature is a factor
beneting electricity production from solar compared to other countries with more so-
lar radiation14.
Cloud cover and shade are the enemies of solar production, as they can reduce electric-
ity produced by solar cells signicantly (50% and more15), depending on the thickness of
the cloud cover. However, an alternative phenomenon can emerge when the sun moves
between the clouds, as then solar cells will receive direct sunlight plus the one reected
from the clouds which may even lead to a higher peak output compared to cloudless
12Solar radiation maps are freely available online and can be obtained for example from:
http://www.deutschesolar.de/en/solar-power/solar-radiation-map/ (Company information ) or from
the European Commission (http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvgis/countries/europe/g13y_de.png)
13http://www.elec.uow.edu.au/apqrc/content/technotes/UOW009_Tech%20Note%2010_AW_screen.pdf
14Annual average temperatures ranges between 7 and 10 degrees Celsius for Germany
15http://www.sunfarmers.com/do-solar-panels-work-when-its-cloudy
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days16. Similarly a rainy day (with thick cloud cover) can reduce the production from
solar energy by as much as 90%. As described above, the peak output can be higher on
a mixed day due to additional sunlight reection and the cooling eect of rain and or
clouds. However, these extreme high peak outputs are typically short-lived and should
not aect the monthly average return.
Other extreme weather events such as snow and ice can aect the quantity of sunlight
absorbed by the solar panel when they block the sun, and again, a very thin snow cover
can even have benecial eect on the electricity amount produced due to additionally
reected sunlight.
2.4 Data sources and summary statistics
2.4.1 Data sources
The present study uses a unique dataset combining the universe of all household solar
PV installations in Germany for the period 2000-2008 with highly detailed weather in-
formation obtained from the German Weather Service.17
Installation Data for renewable energies are available from the online platform of elec-
tricity network transmission operator18. The data contains all installations that are con-
nected to the electricity network and that are subject to the German FIT policy, which
implies practically all household solar PV plants19. Even though installation data is avail-
able until the end of 2011, I limit my sample to the period January 2000 to December 2008.
The choice of this sample period is mainly due to changes in the FIT policy schemes for
solar PV, as outlined in the previous section. The total number of individual PV instal-
lations in Germany for that time period is 452,854. However this number is likely to be
too high as the data contains duplicates and observations that are locally not assignable.
16http://www.streetdirectory.com/travel_guide/125965/computers/eects_of_clouds_on_a_solar_panel.html
17Deutscher Wetter Dienst, DWD
18http://www.eeg-kwk.net/de/index.htm
19Given the technology cost, installations have been economically feasible only through FIT support
policies. Further technological limitations in electricity storage imply that households with PV have to
be connected to the electricity network. The number of plants used completely in autarky is negligible.
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After cleaning for observations that do not provide a local identier and report zero
capacity (31 observations), I restrict my sample to household plants with an installed ca-
pacity smaller or equal to 10 kilowatt peak (kwp)20. This reduces my sample to a total of
294,460 registered installations. In order to check for possible duplicates, I compare day
of installation, exact address, installed capacity and plant identication number21. All
mentioned identier variables coincide in 76,894 cases, while date, address and capacity
coincide in additional 3,237 cases. Hence my nal sample of solar PV installations con-
sists of 214,329 individual household installations, which I aggregate at county-month
level.
Weather data is provided by the German Weather Service (DWD). In the present anal-
ysis I employ two distinct datasets. First, and in order to be able to merge all county-
month PV plants to weather data, I acquire highly detailed 1 x 1 kilometer grid climate
data for the entire Republic of Germany. The data provides aggregate monthly sunshine
hours and monthly average temperature for the period 2000-2008. I merge the grid data
to counties using Geographic Information System (GIS) Software22. This software allows
me to overlay the grid image with county polygons and merge the two datasets using
their relative geographic position. The appendix (Figure 2.5) provides a visual sample of
the overlay. In a next step, I take averages of sunshine hours and temperature for each
county in a given month. In order to identify weather shocks, I calculate the long-term
mean within a given county-month, e.g. January in county A 23. I follow two strategies
to identify weather shocks: 1) I use the demeaned sunshine hours and temperature data
at county level and assign a dummy equal to one when the weather realization is in the
90th percentile and 2) I assign a shock dummy if the county-month weather lies outside
the one standard deviation, of a typical month in that county.
As outlined above, I use a second, reduced sample of 62 freely available weather sta-
tions. This sample allows me to contrast my ndings in dierent dimensions. First, given
20This is in line with previous literature that focuses on household PV installations in Germany.
21Duplicates may arise in the case that individual plants have been disconnected and newly registered in
case of a change of network operator.
22MapInfo Professional
23For the full sample I construct the weather averages over the period 2000-2011. For the reduced sample,
I follow the same approach, but additionally control for long term averages within each county using
the meteorological 30-year reference period 1970-2000 (as well as 1980-2010).
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the fact that these weather stations report daily observations for a longer time span, I
can contrast the long term averages per county and moreover estimate my empirical
model using higher frequency data (weekly observations). Second, given the fact that
these monitors include additional weather covariates, such as rainfall and snow, I am
able to test for the impact of further weather phenomena and if sunshine is indeed the
main channel aecting investment.
Finally, I include additional covariates to the sample in order to control for time vary-
ing dierences across counties and to test for heterogeneous eects. Data at this level of
disaggregation is available only at annual frequency from the regional statistics database
provided by the German national statistical agency24.
2.4.2 Summary statistics
I combine the above described weather and installation data to a fully balanced panel at
county-month level. For the full weather sample, I am able to merge 342 out of around
400 counties in Germany25. This leads to a total number of 36,936 observations for the
sample period 2000-2008. Table 2.1 in the appendix provides simple summary statis-
tics for the main variables of interest, namely newly added PV installations per county-
month, the distribution of weather shocks (sunshine and temperature) and a list of co-
variates. The rst of the three columns refers to the full sample, while columns two and
three refer to counties whose average number of monthly installations is above/below
the median.
For the full sample period 2000-08, the mean of new installations is 5.48, however there
is strong heterogeneity across counties. The above median counties install on average
around 4.7 times as many solar PV panels than the below median counties. Weather
shocks sun_1sd and sun_p90 26 are equally distributed across the columns.27
24https://www.regionalstatistik.de/genesis/online/logon
25Land reforms and dierences in coding made it dicult to match all counties from the two datasets
unambiguously.
26Dummy equal to 1 if the sunshine hours in a given county is outside the 1standard deviation (90 per-
centile) compared to the long-term average in that county-month.
27Note further that the demeaned values are zero when considering the entire sample period over which
the averages have been drawn (2000-11).
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Insert Table 2.1 here
Covariates are only available for the sub period 2002-08, but as Table 2.1 suggests,
some dierences in the uptake behavior might be explained by observables such as pop-
ulation and number of total houses, which are higher for the above median group. How-
ever, one can also see that the counties that adopt more solar are on average richer, have
considerably less unemployment, are more likely to participate in elections. The fact
that the center-right party (CDU) scores higher for the second column, is mainly driven
by the state of Bavaria, which have traditionally a very strong center-right inclination
and happens to be as well the state with most installations. Note that the number of
high school graduates (as proxy for education), the agricultural surface as well as the
number of home sales adjusted for the size of population in each county do not dier
between the two groups. Table 2.2 in the appendix provides the same summary statistics
for the reduced sample of 62 counties and shows that while the number of newly added
installations as well as weather variables are similarly distributed compared to the full
sample, the subsample seems to capture on average bigger counties (population, number
of houses), which might be due to the location of weather monitors, as those are typi-
cally placed in proximity to airports and hence urban areas. The appendix (Figure 2.9)
provides an overview of the geographic position of freely available weather monitors,
which are distributed all over Germany.
Figure 2.6 on the other hand shows dierences in solar PV uptake behavior across
German states (Laender) for the time period 2002-2008. Even though the Laender follow
a similar pattern, mainly driven by changes in the FIT schedule and an increasing trend,
the data also shows an increase in variability over time. The empirical specication will
take this into consideration.
2.5 Empirical strategy and findings
This section explains in detail the empirical model and identication strategy employed
in this paper. Moreover it discusses the main regression results.
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2.5.1 Identification and empirical model
As pointed out in Busse, Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso (2012), a challenge involved with
empirically testing Projection bias is that the weather at time of purchase should not
impact agents that do not have Projection bias. The advantage of the market under con-
sideration is that solar PV plants are highly durable with an average time of usage of
20-30 years and xed FIT support policies for 20 years. More importantly there is a
time lag between the point in time when the decision to invest is taken and the time
the installation is completed. For 2011 the average time of installation has been 5.3
weeks with a standard deviation of 2.2 weeks28, and has not been shorter in preceding
periods. Hence on average, from the point the purchase decision was made until the
completion of installation, there passes at least one month of time. This means that the
weather in a given period does not aect the utility of the investor directly, but that a re-
sponse to weather shocks can be interpreted as a sign of Projection bias. Moreover, given
the time lag, weather this period does not aect directly the protability of the invest-
ment in the same period and hence is uncorrelated with the error term. Following this
argumentation, a positive and signicant coecient for lag1 and lag2 of the sunshine
shocks could be interpreted as a rst indication of Projection bias. Given randomness of
weather, weather shocks provide a credible exogenous variation that fulll the formal
requirements for an unbiased and consistent OLS estimation. In a rst step I estimate
the following reduced form model:
∆instc,t = α+
M∑
i=0
βi(Li)weatherc,t +
12∑
j=2
δjmj + θt + c,t (2.1)
where the dependent variable∆instc,t captures newly added PV installations in county
c at time t, weatherc,t contains the weather shocks, i.e. positive deviations from
county-month long term means in aggregate sunshine hours, mean temperature, rain,
and snow 29. As introduced in the data section, I rely on two dierent shock denitions,
which are coded according to a zero-one dummy. Current and lagged weather shocks
have no direct impact on protability and assuming randomness holds, do not carry in-
formation about future weather states (i.e. learning) and hence should not aect the in-
28 Seel, Barbose, and Wiser (2013) show in a scoping analysis that mean installation labor in Germany
is around 39 man hours per system. The author would like to thank furthermore Joachim Seel for
sharing his individual survey results regarding total installation times in Germany.
29Given data availability, rain and snow are only tested for the reduced sample.
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vestment decision of investors without Projection bias. Given the timing of installations,
I expect lag 0 not to have any signicant eect. On the other hand if lagged sunshine in
period 1 and period 2 have a signicant impact on the newly added installations, I inter-
pret this as a sign of Projection bias, as likely investors project the current weather state
and perceived utility into the future when making their buying decision. The baseline
denition additionally accounts for time xed eect in order to control for nationwide
trends, such as the level of FIT and prices of solar panels. Monthly dummies account for
the strong seasonality introduced by the announced changes of FIT each year, leading to
bunching of installations in the last months of the year. As weather shocks are dened
according to a demeaned measure at county level, any dierences in absolute weather,
i.e. levels of sunshine is taken into account.
One additional concern might be observable dierences across counties and regions
that lead to dierences in uptake behavior. I introduce a list of covariates, such as popula-
tion, income per capita, number of houses, voting participation, voting for green party,
agricultural surface and unemployment per county that might be correlated with the
number of installations. Moreover, even though weather is random, aggregating and
averaging at monthly level could introduce some correlation between weather covari-
ates, (un)observable county characteristics and the number of newly added installations
per county due to local and temporal correlation of weather shocks. Similar to Cesur,
Tekin, and Ulker (2013), who control for selection on observables by introducing a exi-
ble set of time trends and xed eects, I take this possibility into account by controlling
for potential correlation between weather shocks and time varying covariates.
I test for potential correlation between the shocks and county characteristics in Table
2.3 and nd that the total number of houses, income per capita, the unemployment rate,
percentage of green voters as well as percentage of high school graduates and number
of residential buildings to population are signicantly correlated with the shock. Con-
trolling for aggregate time xed eects, but more importantly for county time trends
as well as state-by-year xed eects, makes this correlation disappear. Hence, the set
of xed eects is necessary to account for the potential bias due to omitted factors that
may be correlated with both the number of new installations and the distribution of
sunshine outliers. The xed eects also control for time varying unobservables such as
local availability and awareness of the technology, and hence relax the parallel trend as-
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sumption. There might have been local support and information campaigns for solar PV
that are not captured by the nationwide trends. Figure 2.7 and 2.8 in the appendix show
exemplary dierences in time trends of newly added solar PV installations in a high-
adoption county and low-adoption county. The county xed eect additionally allows
for permanent dierences across counties. I hence estimate the following augmented
model:
∆instc,t = α+
M∑
i=0
β1,i(Li)weatherc,t + β2Xc,t +
12∑
j=2
δjmj + θt+
+ψct+ νct
2 + γy,l + λc + c,t
(2.2)
Where in addition to equation (2.1) I introduce a linear (ψct) and quadratic time trend
(νct2) for each county as well as state-by-year xed eect (γy,l), and in the most strin-
gent specication county xed eect (λc). The set of additional control variables are
captured by Xc,t.
2.5.2 Main findings
This section describes the main results obtained from estimating the empirical model
for a number of specications, shock denitions, and subsamples. In a rst step, and in
order to obtain benchmark results, I regress the number of newly added installations per
county on lagged sunshine shock dummies as introduced in the data section. I use two
dierent denitions: First I use demeaned aggregate sunshine hours that lie outside the
1 standard deviation of a typical county-month and second, I look at the more extreme
outliers, using the outliers that are above the 90th percentile of the demeaned sunshine
hours in a given county and month. I take into account the possibility of correlation
between weather shocks and unobservable county characteristics by introducing time
trends and state-by-year xed eects that furthermore account for the dynamic uptake
behavior across counties. The results in Table 2.4 show the estimation results for dier-
ent set of controls.
Insert Table 2.4 here
While only regressing the lagged sunshine shocks on the new number of installation
produces negative estimates, that are large in magnitude and signicant, introducing ag-
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gregate time xed eects, county specic time trends, and state-year xed eects leads
to more convincing results. In specications (3) - (5), lag zero is never signicant, both
lag1 and 2 of sunshine show a positive and highly signicant estimate (but lag1 for model
3). The county specic time trends could be interpreted as baseline growth rate for each
county.30 The accumulated eect for lagged sunshine shocks is about 0.5 new instal-
lations or an increase of 7-8% evaluated at the mean. The standard errors, reported in
parenthesis are county-cluster adjusted in order to account for potential heteroskedas-
ticity and correlation within counties.
Comparing these results to a sunshine shock denition according to the 90 percentile
denition (Table 2.5), the results are robust to shock denition. The same lags show up to
be signicant now for all models (3) - (5) and, as expected, the eects are slightly larger in
magnitude. One concern for the here presented results could be that abnormal weather
might cause a short run substitution eect, i.e. rational decision maker plan their invest-
ment and make the purchase whenever it happens to be a sunny period. I can test for this
alternative hypothesis in two ways. First, in order to directly address short-run inter-
temporal substitution of purchases, I look more closely at the coecients related to the
distributive-lag model as estimated. Following the analysis of Busse, Pope, Pope, and
Silva-Risso (2012) and other papers looking at inter-temporal substitution using weather
shocks ( Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007) and Deschenes and Moretti (2009)) I add up
all signicant lagged coecients and verify if these add up to an eect dierent from
zero. In case it is zero, it is likely to be the case that an exceptional sunshine month
only displaces the installations from one month to another (harvesting eect). However,
I do not nd such evidence for the present data in any of my specications. Second, I
can test for the "sunny-day" hypothesis by looking at other related factors, such as rain.
One possible interpretation would be that people decide rationally about investing, but
wait for a sunny period (a nice day) to go and actually make the deal. I can test for the
impact of rain using the reduced sample of 62 counties at both monthly and weekly data
frequency. The results, presented in the next section indicate that a rainy month does
not have a clear impact on the investment decision of the household. I interpret these
ndings that the main channel through with sunshine aects the investment choice is
30The results do not depend on the inclusion of the county time trends; regressing model specication (4)
with a linear time trend alone or without time trend does not alter the main ndings. Lag1 and Lag 2
are positive and highly signicant with a magnitude of around 0.5
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indeed Projection bias.
Before looking at the eect of both sunshine and temperature outliers, I perform two
initial model specication tests. Table 2.6 in the appendix additionally includes a for-
ward lag. When using the 90 percentile denition, agents should not be able to forecast
weather shocks in the next period and base their investment decision on this. The inclu-
sion of the forward lag shifts slightly the signicance of lag 0, however the signicant
negative eect at lag 0 is counterbalanced at lag 1, with a zero-net eect. Lag 2 in this
specication shows still an aggregate eect of about 0.5 and is highly signicant. More-
over, Table 2.7 on the other hand includes in addition to time and county xed eects
the set of time varying control variables. Note that due to data availability this reduces
the sample size to the period 2002-08, and hence provides a further robustness check.
Including only the set of controls to the simplest OLS regression (1), leads to negative
and very large eects. As outlined above, these results are biased strongly due to the
correlation of the sunshine shock with other unobserved covariates. However, taking
this into account, introducing a rich set of xed eects, the results are aligned with the
previous ndings, and show a slightly higher eect for the period 2002-08.
Insert Table 2.8 here
In Table 2.8, I look also at the potential impact of temperature on investment. I run
the dierent models including both sunshine and temperature shocks (using the 90 per-
centile denition). In addition to the question if temperature triggers investment, the
inclusion of further shocks are a good robustness check due to the correlation of sun-
shine and temperature. While for model specication (4) and (5) lag 1 and lag 2 of the
sunshine shock are highly signicant (p < 0.01) and show a very similar size than before-
hand, non of the temperature lags, but lag 3 at model (5) are of importance. I conclude
that it is indeed sunshine that triggers investment in solar PV.
One concern with weather data are non-linear eects, as it has been highlighted by
the previous literature (see for example Zivin and Neidell (2010)). Figures 2.3 and 2.4
show the impact of dierent bins for demeaned sunshine in a given county-month on
new installations31. The empirical model follows specication (4) and includes time FE,
3195% condence intervals plotted together with the point estimates. Category 4 (zero mean) omitted.
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Figure 2.3: Non-linear eects for lag1 demeaned sunshine
county time trends and state-by-year FE. While for lag 1 only bins 8 and 9, the highest
outliers, are signicantly dierent from zero and positive, for lag 2 bins 7 to 9 are signif-
icant and positive. No other bin is signicant which gives further credit to the ndings
above that it is indeed the positive extreme sunshine deviation that trigger new instal-
lations. Negative deviations do not seem to have any eect32.
Finally looking at heterogeneous eects for Projection bias, Table 2.9 summarizes the
estimation results following the main regression specication (4). In line with Costa
and Kahn (2013), I would like to test whether political ideology has an inuence on the
uptake behavior in solar PV. As presented in the summary statistics, the voting outcome
for the green party in above and below median counties in terms of solar PV installa-
tions does not vary signicantly, however political ideology could play an important role
in terms of how beliefs are shaped. Given the fact that solar PV installations, a "green
technology", can be strongly identied with the green party program, I am interested to
see whether in counties where the political engagement and the green party had strong
results in the 2002 and 2005 federal elections, I can nd any dierences in technology up-
take due to Projection Bias33. For this purpose I interact the treatment variable "sunshine
32Note furthermore that the non-linear regression model does not depend on the denition of the cut-o
rule for extreme events, but includes all demeaned sunshine categories.
33Green voters might be more idealistic and hence be easier inuenced by short-lived weather shocks and
their investment decision in solar PV.
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Figure 2.4: Non-linear eects for lag2 demeaned sunshine
shock" with a dummy equal to 1 if in a given country the vote participation has been
above the median (VotePartp(50)) in order to capture political engagement, if the green
party’s election results have been above the median (column 2) or the 75 percentile (col-
umn3)34 Finally, column 4 to column 6 of the same table test for heterogeneity in terms
of economic covariates: household income (column 4), unemployment rate (column 5)
and living in Eastern Germany (column 6).
Insert Table 2.9 here
While the coecients for the sunshine shock are in line with the previous ndings,
the heterogeneity results reveal that political orientation and involvement matter, but
economic covariates seem not to play an important role. I nd that in counties where
the vote participation in the federal elections has been above the median lag 2 of the
interaction term is positive and signicant at 5%. Looking specically at the outcome
of the green party, as proxy for environmental orientation, I nd that in case I use the
above median denition, both lag1 and lag2 are signicant and positive at 10%, i.e. the
eect of Projection bias is more pronounced in green counties. These results gain even
more momentum when looking at those counties in which the green party received their
highest voting shares (p75). In this case I nd that compared to the average eect the
eect in green counties is double the size. Hence, this might indeed indicate that green
34Typically the vote participation is higher in counties where smaller parties yield stronger results as
these tend to mobilize their electorate more than the bigger parties.
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voters are more idealistic and can be easier inuenced by short-lived weather phenom-
ena. Interestingly, the dierences in income and unemployment as well as East vs. West
Germany do not have any impact on the presence of Projection bias.
2.6 Robustness
In addition to the specication tests presented in the previous section, I perform a series
of robustness checks, employing a second, reduced, sample of 62 stations which contains
additional weather covariates at higher frequency. Figure 2.9 in the appendix provides
the geographic position of these freely available weather stations.
First, and in order to check for consistency, I reestimate the original model to compare
the results qualitatively and quantitatively. Table 2.10 in the appendix provides the main
results and shows that specication (5) is able to reproduce the same results as we’ve seen
with the full sample. In this case, lag 2 is signicant at 5% and shows a magnitude of
0.436. All other lags are not signicant for the 90 percentile sunshine shock denition.
On the other hand, looking at specication (3) and (4) lag zero appears to be the only
signicant lag at 10% signicance, which however is endogenous to the investment de-
cision and should not play any important role. Note moreover that the individual point
estimates for lag 1 and lag 2 are in line with the previous ndings, only the standard
errors are broader due to the reduced sample size, leading to non-signicant estimates.
Table 2.11 includes all lag zero to lag three sunshine, temperature, snow and rain
shocks, dened according to the 90 percentile rule. For model (5) only lag 2 of sunshine
shows up to be signicant, with an point estimate of 0.48 which is very much aligned
with the overall ndings. All other weather shocks do not seem to have an impact on
the investment decision. Again, focusing on the impact of sunshine shocks, the point
estimates for model (4) are similar to the ndings in specication (5), but with a lower
signicance.
In a last step, I use the reduced sample and look at weekly data frequency. Table 2.12
shows the weekly results for sunshine shocks according to the 90 percentile rule. For
model (3)-(5) only week 6 shows up to be signicant, but negative. No other lag seems
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to play an important role. Adding other weather shocks to the analysis (Table 2.13),
can help to shed further light into the analysis. The negative sunshine lag 6 seems to
be compensated by a positive sign of a similar magnitude for temperature at the same
lag. However given the potential correlation between sunshine and temperature these
eects are dicult to disentangle. Other weather phenomena seem to play only a minor
role. Rain shows a negative eect at lag 9 in specication (1), (4) and (5), indicating that
a very rainy week might actually lead to less installations compared to the baseline. This
could indicate that a negative weather shock leads to some displacement. On the other
hand, and due to the negative correlation between rain and sunshine, this ndings could
be also interpreted as a sign of Projection bias. The positive correlation for snow at lag 7
is puzzling.
Overall, the weekly analysis does not provide clear-cut evidence in favor or against the
Projection bias hypothesis. Weekly data however allows me to perform another model
specication test, namely to test if bad weather conditions, such as a heavy week of
snow, leads to signicantly less installations in the regression framework. Table 2.14
provides such evidence. For all model specications (3) - (5) an extreme week of snow at
lag zero shows a negative and signicant impact for county-week installations, with a
0.2 magnitude. Interestingly this eect is reversed at lag 3, showing a positive and signif-
icant eect of the same size, leading to a zero aggregate eect. To conclude the analysis
of weekly data, the fact that I am not nding clear evidence for Projection bias at higher
frequency, might indicate that weekly weather is too volatile and thus households do
not base their long-term investment decisions on it. My ndings indicate that it needs
a period of stable weather (a month outlier in sunshine) to trigger investment decisions
that have an eect on aggregate uptake.
One potential shortcoming of the present paper is the focus on the demand side only
and thus the analysis does not account for potential general equilibrium eects, i.e. one
could think of the theoretical possibility that lagged sunshine shocks have an impact on
current demand, which makes suppliers react and adjust prices upwards. Hence weather
shocks would be correlated with prices, which could potentially lead to biased estimates.
However, given the strong supply side (technology) driven cost decrease of solar energy
in the sample period, this is rather a hypothetical possibility; using furthermore a rich
set of xed-eects allows to take care of such possibility. Moreover, if sunshine shocks
68
Chapter 2. Projection bias in household investment?
make the sellers react, promoting their technologies or making special oers, my es-
timates capture a joint eect between increases in demand and selling eort, which is
nevertheless not less important. Generally, the impact of Projection bias on supply, re-
mains a possibility for future research.
Another possible interpretation of the results could be given in the light of Li, John-
son, and Zaval (2011), that investigate how believes about climate change are aected
by daily temperature. They conrm that survey respondents that thought the day was
warmer than usual believed more in and had greater concern on global warming. Given
the available data, I cannot distinguish between investors that build future return expec-
tations on the current state of the weather, and thus showing clear evidence of Projection
bias, and those that form rational expectations but build them on a wrong forecast. How-
ever, climate change beliefs are inuenced by temperature and not by sunshine, and as
pointed out in the results section, there is no evidence for a signicant eect of tem-
perature shocks on investment. In any case, for rational investors short term weather
uctuations should not have a signicant impact on their adoption decision, if these
weather shocks do not contain direct information about future climatic developments.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper provides clear evidence that household investment decisions in an irreversible
good are aected by Projection bias. Using data from solar PV installations in Germany,
I show that an extremely sunny month has a signicant impact on the number of new
installations per county. A one standard deviation shock in terms of monthly sunshine
hours leads to additional 0.5 solar installations in a given county, translating to an ap-
proximate increase of 8% for the sample period 2000-08. Households hence project cur-
rent weather states into the future when forming expectations about investment prof-
itability. Weekly sunshine outliers as well as other weather variables (temperature, rain,
and snow) do not seem to have any inuence on technology uptake. The results are
robust to a wide range of shock denition, specication, and robustness checks.
The ndings furthermore indicate that Projection bias can dier by political ideol-
ogy. In the present case, solar PV can be directly linked to the political belief of the
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Green party voter, I nd that Projection bias is indeed stronger in counties where the
Green party received its highest voting shares. The policy maker could build on these
insights to formulate more ecient and better targeted information campaigns. On the
other hand, providing evidence for Projection bias in an irreversible investment decision
means that likely also other important household decisions are inuenced by Projection
bias ( Busse, Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso (2012)). The policy maker should be aware of
this possibility.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Summary statistics
Figure 2.5 presents an overlay of monthly sunshine hours (1 x 1 km grid) with county
limits. The shading intensity refers to aggregate sunshine hours at each grid point, where
darker areas represent more sun. The data plot displays data for one month only (April
2000) and clearly indicates heterogeneity in terms of aggregate monthly sunshine hours
across Germany.35
35Long-term average sunshine radiation does not necessarily coincide with the here presented graph,
which is thought to show heterogeneity at monthly level as well as the GIS overlay. The darker areas in
central Germany correspond to areas that also have higher average sunshine hours due to geographic
conditions.
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Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics by technology adoption: full sample
all > median inst. <= median inst.
PV installations and weather: 2000-08
new installations county month 5.48 9.03 1.93
sun_1sd 0.15 0.15 0.15
sun_p90 0.08 0.08 0.08
demean_sunhours -0.31 -0.18 -0.44
temp_1sd 0.16 0.16 0.16
temp_p90 0.09 0.09 0.10
demean_temp 1.30 1.21 1.39
Observations 36936 18468 18468
Covariates: 2002-08
houses 40195 50368 30082
HHinc_pc 17400 18109 16696
population 176687 206450 147098
unemploy_percent 10.77 8.18 13.34
highschool_rat 0.30 0.24 0.37
surf_agricul_rat 31.97 32.22 31.72
buildings_residential_rat 0.19 0.22 0.17
home_sales_rat 0.13 0.13 0.12
vote_particip 78.13 80.06 76.21
p_vote_cdu 39.29 44.71 33.91
p_vote_spd 35.62 33.11 38.12
p_vote_green 6.98 6.97 6.99
p_vote_fdp 8.23 8.46 8.00
p_vote_linke 6.40 3.36 9.43
p_vote_other 3.48 3.39 3.56
Observations 28644 14280 14364
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Table 2.2: Sample Characteristics by technology adoption: reduced sample
all > median inst. <= median inst.
PV installations and weather: 2000-08
new installations county month 5.18 8.72 1.64
sun_1sd 0.16 0.16 0.16
sun_p90 0.09 0.09 0.08
demean_sunhours 0.14 0.29 -0.01
temp_1sd 0.16 0.16 0.16
temp_p90 0.10 0.10 0.10
demean_temp 0.11 0.10 0.12
Observations 6696 3348 3348
Covariates: 2002-08
houses 43553 56854 29792
HHinc_pc 16826 17649 15910
population 223356 269074 176061
unemploy_percent 12.66 9.74 15.68
highschool_rat 0.34 0.26 0.43
surf_agricul_rat 28.47 32.35 24.46
buildings_residential_rat 0.18 0.23 0.13
home_sales_rat 0.12 0.13 0.10
vote_particip 76.50 79.19 73.73
p_vote_cdu 37.16 42.38 31.75
p_vote_spd 34.76 33.81 35.74
p_vote_green 7.52 7.85 7.17
p_vote_fdp 7.96 8.41 7.49
p_vote_linke 9.12 4.47 13.93
p_vote_other 3.49 3.08 3.92
Observations 4956 2520 2436
72
Chapter 2. Projection bias in household investment?
Figure 2.5: Overlay monthly sunshine data and county boundaries.
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Figure 2.6: Newly added installations by state (Bundesland)
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Figure 2.7: Evolution of solar PV diusion in a high-adoption county
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of solar PV di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2.8.2 Regression results
75
Chapter 2. Projection bias in household investment?
Figure 2.9: Geographic position of freely available weather stations in Germany (DWD).
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Table 2.3: Model selection: Predictability of sunshine shock - 1sd denition
Dependent variable:
Sunshine shock (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Total houses 0.000*** 0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH income per capita 0.000*** –0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vote participation –0.001 0.000 –0.001 –0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Unemployment rate 0.005*** 0.001 –0.013*** –0.003 –0.005**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Vote Green 0.177*** 0.098 0.221 –0.347 –0.840
(0.062) (0.068) (0.278) (0.380) (0.647)
High school (%) –3.096** –0.006 –1.594 –4.295 –6.581
(1.264) (1.010) (3.005) (4.514) (4.961)
Agric. surface (%) –0.007 0.012** 0.271 0.418 0.659
(0.007) (0.006) (0.529) (0.497) (0.679)
Resid. buildings (%) 21.059*** 0.008 –8.389* –3.814 –4.662
(2.249) (1.663) (4.304) (3.327) (4.042)
Sales cases –0.060 0.051 –3.948 –1.036 0.725
(2.340) (1.651) (4.439) (3.632) (4.509)
Observations 32736 32736 32736 32736 32736
R2 0.004 0.240 0.279 0.292 0.291
Time FEs N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Dierent model specications: Sunshine shock - 1sd denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunshine shock:
sun –0.371*** –0.323** –0.040 0.068 0.038
(0.097) (0.129) (0.096) (0.094) (0.091)
L.sun –0.760*** –0.199* 0.097 0.253*** 0.225***
(0.086) (0.112) (0.078) (0.083) (0.081)
L2.sun –0.222*** 0.102 0.314*** 0.438*** 0.413***
(0.086) (0.130) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084)
L3.sun –0.330*** –0.770*** –0.276*** –0.134 –0.152*
(0.097) (0.125) (0.088) (0.081) (0.082)
L4.sun –0.499*** –0.459*** –0.128* –0.052 –0.065
(0.085) (0.112) (0.072) (0.075) (0.073)
Observations 35568 35568 35568 35568 35568
R2 0.002 0.216 0.600 0.623 0.487
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Dierent model specications: Sunshine shock - p(90) denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunshine shock:
sun –0.591*** –0.732*** –0.147 0.018 –0.060
(0.119) (0.148) (0.126) (0.121) (0.119)
L.sun –0.613*** –0.296** 0.248** 0.461*** 0.382***
(0.104) (0.123) (0.099) (0.100) (0.098)
L2.sun 0.009 –0.040 0.342*** 0.542*** 0.451***
(0.098) (0.124) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098)
L3.sun –0.378*** –1.020*** –0.248** –0.081 –0.168*
(0.093) (0.131) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096)
L4.sun –0.337*** –0.622*** –0.095 –0.015 –0.088
(0.088) (0.118) (0.084) (0.080) (0.081)
Observations 35568 35568 35568 35568 35568
R2 0.001 0.216 0.600 0.623 0.487
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Dierent model specications: Include forward lag - p(90) denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
F.sun 0.113 –0.269** –0.065 0.154 0.110
(0.118) (0.137) (0.103) (0.100) (0.103)
sun –0.875*** –1.184*** –0.537*** –0.294*** –0.352***
(0.095) (0.145) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105)
L.sun –0.405*** –0.524*** 0.032 0.298*** 0.238**
(0.100) (0.134) (0.097) (0.101) (0.099)
L2.sun 0.251*** –0.140 0.288*** 0.527*** 0.461***
(0.096) (0.126) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095)
L3.sun –0.131 –1.013*** –0.359*** –0.177* –0.239**
(0.089) (0.132) (0.098) (0.096) (0.095)
L4.sun –0.090 –0.581*** –0.105 0.010 –0.046
(0.087) (0.121) (0.085) (0.082) (0.083)
Observations 35226 35226 35226 35226 35226
R2 0.001 0.179 0.581 0.601 0.434
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.7: Dierent model specications: Adding Controls - p(90) denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
sun –1.354*** –0.727*** –0.008 0.108 0.096
(0.131) (0.155) (0.129) (0.123) (0.120)
L.sun –1.421*** –0.265* 0.397*** 0.593*** 0.572***
(0.127) (0.135) (0.107) (0.107) (0.105)
L2.sun –0.783*** –0.085 0.409*** 0.591*** 0.558***
(0.104) (0.136) (0.104) (0.106) (0.103)
L3.sun –1.150*** –1.055*** –0.119 0.020 –0.024
(0.111) (0.143) (0.102) (0.101) (0.099)
L4.sun –1.050*** –0.620*** 0.020 0.035 –0.007
(0.104) (0.126) (0.087) (0.083) (0.083)
Observations 27280 27280 27280 27280 27280
R2 0.008 0.223 0.677 0.700 0.550
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Dierent model specications: Including both sunshine and temperature shocks
(p90)
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunshine shock:
sun –0.405*** –0.760*** –0.134 0.027 –0.053
(0.129) (0.152) (0.131) (0.127) (0.125)
L.sun –0.238** –0.218* 0.221** 0.479*** 0.400***
(0.112) (0.126) (0.101) (0.105) (0.102)
L2.sun 0.057 –0.190 0.270*** 0.489*** 0.395***
(0.102) (0.129) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103)
L3.sun –0.366*** –0.991*** –0.206** –0.027 –0.114
(0.104) (0.132) (0.099) (0.097) (0.096)
L4.sun –0.154* –0.643*** –0.177** –0.057 –0.134
(0.088) (0.120) (0.088) (0.084) (0.085)
Temperature shock:
temp –0.727*** –0.058 0.015 0.015 0.020
(0.099) (0.105) (0.091) (0.097) (0.096)
L.temp –1.096*** –0.157 0.198 –0.018 –0.015
(0.100) (0.141) (0.123) (0.133) (0.131)
L2.temp 0.024 0.544*** 0.465*** 0.110 0.130
(0.088) (0.120) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
L3.temp 0.121 0.160 0.281*** –0.198* –0.174
(0.111) (0.133) (0.091) (0.113) (0.111)
L4.temp –0.537*** 0.021 0.445*** 0.021 0.044
(0.103) (0.108) (0.091) (0.096) (0.095)
Observations 35568 35568 35568 35568 35568
R2 0.003 0.216 0.600 0.623 0.487
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
State trend N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Reduced sample: Monthly observations - p(90) denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunshine shock:
sun –0.534*** –0.572** –0.606*** –0.363* –0.284
(0.183) (0.228) (0.182) (0.204) (0.187)
L.sun –0.344 –0.071 –0.125 0.108 0.188
(0.249) (0.284) (0.244) (0.215) (0.190)
L2.sun 0.414* 0.449* 0.192 0.349 0.436**
(0.245) (0.264) (0.223) (0.229) (0.209)
L3.sun –0.119 –0.439 –0.363 –0.231 –0.149
(0.213) (0.263) (0.224) (0.229) (0.196)
L4.sun –0.136 –0.232 –0.237 –0.206 –0.131
(0.263) (0.295) (0.194) (0.170) (0.164)
Observations 6448 6448 6448 6448 6448
R2 0.001 0.171 0.542 0.575 0.411
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Reduced sample: All weather shocks - p(90) denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
L.sun –0.160 0.073 –0.037 0.143 0.219
(0.265) (0.278) (0.245) (0.210) (0.193)
L2.sun 0.367 0.450* 0.250 0.411* 0.480**
(0.266) (0.249) (0.229) (0.225) (0.210)
L3.sun –0.247 –0.434* –0.356* –0.165 –0.091
(0.227) (0.241) (0.213) (0.221) (0.195)
L.temp –0.774*** 0.013 0.301 0.128 0.070
(0.194) (0.253) (0.205) (0.229) (0.223)
L2.temp –0.162 0.387* 0.368 0.049 –0.001
(0.174) (0.226) (0.233) (0.220) (0.208)
L3.temp 0.258 0.239 0.256 –0.127 –0.180
(0.245) (0.276) (0.192) (0.225) (0.227)
L.snow 2.191** 0.795 0.589 0.498 0.513
(0.898) (0.786) (0.510) (0.429) (0.421)
L2.snow 0.320 0.149 0.092 0.088 0.130
(0.747) (0.747) (0.392) (0.352) (0.374)
L3.snow 0.536 0.730 0.424 0.441 0.460
(0.790) (0.853) (0.546) (0.522) (0.491)
L.rain –0.664** 0.121 –0.006 –0.288 –0.177
(0.273) (0.189) (0.172) (0.175) (0.180)
L2.rain –0.275 –0.074 –0.200 –0.371* –0.250
(0.271) (0.214) (0.180) (0.186) (0.185)
L3.rain –0.241 –0.302 –0.314 –0.431** –0.312
(0.298) (0.251) (0.215) (0.204) (0.190)
Observations 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510
R2 0.005 0.173 0.541 0.576 0.412
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.12: Reduced sample: weekly data - p(90) sunshine shock
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
L5.sun –0.157*** –0.046 –0.034 –0.024 –0.028
(0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.035)
L6.sun –0.186*** –0.098*** –0.105*** –0.097*** –0.101***
(0.040) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030)
L7.sun –0.071 0.006 –0.022 –0.016 –0.020
(0.049) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039)
L8.sun –0.059** –0.004 –0.020 –0.018 –0.021
(0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
L9.sun –0.033 0.033 0.012 0.017 0.014
(0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060)
L10.sun –0.054 0.018 –0.002 0.001 –0.002
(0.042) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
L11.sun –0.060* –0.003 –0.015 –0.006 –0.009
(0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033)
L12.sun –0.119*** –0.038 –0.043 –0.039 –0.042
(0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) (0.036)
Observations 28272 28272 28272 28272 28272
R2 0.001 0.102 0.277 0.294 0.184
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.13: Weekly data: all weather shocks - p(90) denition
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
L6.sun –0.190*** –0.082** –0.107*** –0.097*** –0.099***
(0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029)
L7.sun –0.087* 0.016 –0.030 –0.021 –0.024
(0.048) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
L8.sun –0.065** –0.000 –0.028 –0.022 –0.025
(0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
L9.sun –0.039 0.029 0.002 0.009 0.006
(0.060) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
L6.temp 0.024 0.008 0.087** 0.072** 0.073**
(0.044) (0.039) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034)
L7.temp 0.022 –0.046 0.009 –0.004 –0.004
(0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
L8.temp –0.067 –0.014 0.022 0.010 0.010
(0.042) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
L9.temp –0.050 –0.018 –0.006 –0.017 –0.017
(0.045) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
L6.rain 0.079 0.149 0.126 0.118 0.120
(0.120) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
L7.rain –0.054 0.027 0.008 –0.002 –0.001
(0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
L8.rain –0.044 –0.014 –0.017 –0.032 –0.030
(0.035) (0.037) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
L9.rain –0.112*** –0.028 –0.047 –0.063** –0.061**
(0.040) (0.036) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
L6.snow 0.200 –0.069 –0.076 –0.053 –0.030
(0.131) (0.124) (0.080) (0.075) (0.073)
L7.snow 0.273** 0.173 0.189* 0.191* 0.208**
(0.134) (0.127) (0.100) (0.100) (0.102)
L8.snow 0.101 0.051 0.050 0.064 0.083
(0.161) (0.153) (0.140) (0.136) (0.136)
L9.snow –0.112 –0.011 –0.000 0.004 0.025
(0.116) (0.118) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069)
Observations 28458 28458 28458 28458 28458
R2 0.001 0.103 0.278 0.295 0.186
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.14: Weekly data: model selection - p(90) rain and snow
Dependent variable:
New PV installations
(county-month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
rain 0.004 0.096* 0.066 0.063 0.068
(0.061) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
L.rain –0.217*** –0.125*** –0.148*** –0.149*** –0.145***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
L2.rain –0.129*** –0.008 –0.029 –0.035 –0.031
(0.040) (0.036) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
L3.rain 0.016 0.076* 0.052 0.043 0.046
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
snow –0.123 –0.157 –0.212** –0.224** –0.208**
(0.132) (0.129) (0.102) (0.092) (0.093)
L.snow 0.030 0.026 –0.010 –0.006 0.006
(0.104) (0.100) (0.081) (0.071) (0.074)
L2.snow 0.134 0.090 0.053 0.059 0.072
(0.101) (0.097) (0.072) (0.066) (0.067)
L3.snow 0.449*** 0.228* 0.203*** 0.215*** 0.234***
(0.133) (0.119) (0.073) (0.067) (0.068)
Observations 28830 28830 28830 28830 28830
R2 0.002 0.104 0.278 0.296 0.188
Time FE N Y Y Y Y
County trends N N Y Y Y
State-yr FE N N N Y Y
County FE N N N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Chapter 3
The impact of feed-in-taris onhouse-
hold investment in photovoltaics.
3.1 Introduction
Increasing private investment in renewable energy sources (RES) is an important public
policy target. In addition to the climate change goals decided upon by the member states
of the European Union in 2007, 1 Germany adopted the far-reaching goal to increase the
share of renewable sources in gross electricity production to 35% by 2020. The commit-
ment to increase investment in renewables has been further reinforced by the nuclear
incident in Japan in March 2011, which led to the immediate shutdown of eight out of
the originally 17 nuclear power plants and to the plan to completely resign from nuclear
energy by 2022.2
In order to support RES deployment, the German government introduced in 2000 a
novel policy tool: feed-in taris (FIT). FIT oer long-term contractual agreements to pro-
ducers of renewable energy that guarantee access to the electricity network at a xed rate
above the electricity market price. This policy tool was designed to guarantee ex-ante
planning security and protability for producers of renewable energy with the objective
to incentivize investment. FIT policies typically distinguish type and size of installa-
tion, and in the case of solar PV, were especially targeted towards private households3.
Thanks to nancial incentives, solar PV installations have found increasing popularity
in recent years. However, even though FIT can be considered successful in reaching their
principal objective, to increase the participation of RES in the overall energy mix4, they
1The so called 20-20-20 targets involve a reduction of 20% in greenhouse gases from 1990 levels, 20% of
energy consumption produced by renewables, and an improvement of 20% of the European Union’s
energy eciency.
2Nuclear energy accounted for 23% of gross electricity generation in 2010.
3Small scale roof mounted household installations receive the highest FIT remuneration.
4As pointed out by the European Commission and the International Energy Agency, one key element
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are also expensive. In 2009 alone, a total of 10,779 million Euros had to be covered in
form of an additional surcharge in order to pay for FIT. Around one third of this amount
can be attributed directly to the support of solar PV5. Finding the optimal way to incen-
tivize investment in solar while taking into consideration cost developments hence has
important welfare implications.
This paper has the objective to analyze further how FIT support policies aect the
investment decision of households in solar PV and how changes in the FIT schedule
matter for the aggregate technology uptake. Given the dynamic nature of household
investment decisions, I build my analysis on a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model
based on the economic literature on household optimization problems in durable goods,
such as Adda and Cooper (2000) or Adda and Ottaviani (2005).
Investigating household energy behavior has a relatively long tradition in the eco-
nomic literature. Most of the papers follow an applied approach and focus on the quan-
tication of household energy demand (see Taylor (1975) for an early survey), or em-
pirical specication of demand elasticities Dubin and McFadden (1984) or Reiss and
White (2005). In recent years, a growing literature has emerged dealing with household
investment in RES, and in particular in solar PV. Lobel and Perakis (2011) develop a
consumer choice model for forecasting demand and designing incentives for solar tech-
nology applied to the case of Germany. They use a random utility demand model to
describe the household purchase behavior and in a second step solve a dynamic opti-
mization problem for the optimal subsidy policy. Their ndings show that it would be
more cost ecient to have higher subsidies in the near future and to phase-out subsidies
faster than proposed by the current law. In another paper Wand and Leuthold (2011)
follow closely the modeling approach by Benthem, Gillingham, and Sweeney (2008) in
order to analyze the FIT policy in Germany from a more generalized welfare perspective.
Using a partial equilibrium approach, they evaluate the FIT policy by weighing the ben-
ets from induced learning and avoided environmental externalities against the social
costs of promoting residential PV. Similarly, Creti and Joaug (2012) study the optimal
in the success of the penetration through renewables have been FIT, rst experienced by Germany’s
2000 RES Act.
5See position papers from the regulating authority for renewable energy in Germany, available at
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de
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FIT policies from the policy maker perspective, but directly focus on the optimal FIT
schedule and its adjustment in a theoretical setting (see also Shrimali and Baker (2012)
or Alizamir, de Véricourt, and Sun (2012)).
Unlike these papers, that focus on the policy maker optimization problem, I explicitly
model the household environment of the investment decision as a dynamic stochastic
discrete choice model.6 In order to do so, in a rst step I use data from a representative
household survey in Germany (the socio-economic panel, GSOEP) and evaluate the vari-
ables that play a key role in the investment decision. I nd that both income and saving
at the individual level are important determinants of investing in a solar PV plant. Using
furthermore insights from a random-eects Probit model indicates that also the FIT pol-
icy and electricity prices are correlated with the investment decision. I incorporate these
ndings in my model, which moreover allows for learning-by doing, in a sense that the
cost of solar is endogenous to aggregate technology uptake in the economy. Given the
sharp decrease in solar PV cost paired with the increasing utilization of this technology,
this seems an important data feature and should be taken into consideration, as it has
been done by the other studies ( Lobel and Perakis (2011), Wand and Leuthold (2011),
or Benthem, Gillingham, and Sweeney (2008)).
The model estimation is performed in two steps: First, I estimate the income process
and the learning rate using micro-level data from GSOEP as well as aggregate data on
the cost of solar PV and the number of installations. Secondly, I estimate the structural
model parameter using simulated-method of moments (SMM), matching jointly the ag-
gregate sales path and a set of micro-level moments. Finally, the model is used to perform
a series of policy experiments and to quantify how changes in the FIT policy parameters
aect the household decision to invest and how these changes inuence the aggregate
technology uptake. I nd that changes in the individual policy parameters have a dier-
ent impact on aggregate uptake. An increase in the degression rate seems to have the
strongest negative impact on uptake. An increase in the exogenous electricity price on
the other hand leads to additional installations, as households seem to invest in order to
insure themselves against higher electricity prices.
6Lumpiness of household durables has been widely documented for example in the car and housing
market, where it is common to build the analysis on micro-founded demand models.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives a more detailed overview
on the market for solar PV in Germany and the system of feed-in-taris in general. Sec-
tion 3.3 introduces the data as well as the empirical evidence, while section 3.4 describes
in detail the theoretical model. Section 3.5 explains the estimation strategy while section
3.6 performs a series of policy experiments. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The German market for solar PV
The German market for solar PV7 is the single biggest world market, representing 52%
of its total share by the end of 20098. The success of solar energy in Germany has been
widely attributed to the introduction of the renewable energy source act (EEG, for its
letters in German) and the related FIT support scheme in 2000.
Before the year 2000, renewable energy has been supported by the so called ’Stromein-
speisungsgesetz’, in force since 1991; however this act mainly focused on the integration
of smaller power plants (hydroelectric) into the electricity grid. Only with the introduc-
tion of the EEG and the so called "100,000 roof program", that provided investors with
subsidized loans for solar PV installation, technology uptake grew considerably.
The German FIT guarantees investors access to the electricity grid for a period of 20
years (dened as policy horizon) and a xed remuneration for every unit of electricity
produced and sold to the network. In order to account for technological driven cost-
decrease and adoption behavior, the legislator additionally introduced an annual FIT
degression rate of 5%, which applies for new installations only. For instance, if a house-
hold decides to invest at time t, the FIT that applies in that specic year t, is guaranteed
for the entire policy horizon (20 years), while if a household invests in t+ 1 the FIT will
be 5% less. Hence the policy can be summarized in three main parameters: the initial
level of FIT, the annual degression rate and the horizon.
When the EEG was introduced in 2000, support for new solar PV was initially lim-
ited to a total amount of 350 Mega Watt Peak9 of total added capacity. However, this
7This section follows closely Jacobs (2012)
8European Photovoltaic Association
9Installed nominal capacity
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threshold was reached by 2003, and, in order to provide new installations with the FIT
scheme, the federal government acted in late 2003 and introduced the interim law for PV
(Photovoltaik Vorschaltgesetz) - the rst reform of the EEG enacted in January 2004. The
taris were revised upwards, but the annual degression rate was kept stable at 5% until
2009. The reformed EEG in 2009 brought several changes for new installations. Firstly
the lawmaker decided to introduce a so called "sliding degression": if the total amount
of newly installed capacity is above a predicted corridor, the guaranteed taris will be
reduced further in the following year. This measure was mainly introduced to deal with
the massive costs related to the FIT support schemes. Secondly, the EEG 2009 for the
rst time gave incentives to use the generated electricity locally and not to sell o the
full amount to the network. Nevertheless, in the rst period only very few households
adopted this possibility and it became only important with the 2012 revision of the law
that made partial self-consumption mandatory for new installations.
For the analysis, and in order to have a comparable time horizon in terms of policy
incentives, I hence focus on the period 1990 - 2011, as the latest EEG reform might have
changed importantly the incentives of the household to invest.
3.3 Empirical evidence
3.3.1 Data
Figure 3.1 shows the aggregate path of household PV installations as well as the average
cost of installing one kilowatt peak in Germany for the period 2000 to 201110. While the
total number of installations has been growing exponentially from a few thousand to
nearly half a million installations in 2011, the average cost has decreased from around
6500 EUR per kilowatt peak in the year 2000 to around 2200 EUR in 2011. This cost
decrease has been attributed to learning-by-doing in the solar industry (see for exam-
ple Wand and Leuthold (2011), Lobel and Perakis (2011), and Benthem, Gillingham, and
Sweeney (2008)). An increase in aggregate output hence leads to direct reduction of aver-
10As pointed out in the previous literature (see for example Wand and Leuthold (2011)), I dene all plants
with a installed capacity of6 10 kilowatt peak as household installations. The cost refers to the average
system price paid for small scale household PV installations in Germany.
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age technology cost. The aggregate number of installations are obtained from individual
level data that are available from the electricity network carrier 11 and that contain the
universe of solar PV installations. Residential specic solar price data for Germany, on
the other hand, is only available for the period posterior to 200612. I hence use a simple
regression model to back-cast the residential price series, using global prices.13
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Figure 3.1: Total number and cost of household solar PV installations.
Moreover, I make use of household level data from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP), a representative longitudinal study of German households. While the full data
consists of around 21,000 households, it is only from 2007 onwards that the question-
naire includes variables related to renewable energy installations (solar) and only from
2010 detailed information on household electricity consumption. Moreover, the GSOEP
does not allow to identify the exact timing of solar installations and it does not have
information on plant size. I hence use individual level solar PV installation data and
aggregate them at annual level in order to obtain the aggregate technology adoption
path. Secondly, I use the data from the network carrier to obtain estimates of the aver-
age plant size. Even considering these shortcomings, the GSOEP dataset has the main
11http://www.eeg-kwk.net/de/index.htm
12German Solar Industry Association
13Given the high and sustained market share of Germany in the worldwide solar PV market, this rela-
tionship is likely to hold over time. In fact, the predicted price gets arbitrary close to the true price
data for the in-sample period (2006-11) with a mean absolute error of 310 Euros (standard deviation of
262), which represents a deviation of around 6% in 2006.
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advantage that it contains longitudinal information for household and personal charac-
teristics such as income, age, education and living standard variables, that potentially
play an important role in the decision to invest in solar PV and that are included in the
empirical analysis of this paper.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 in the appendix provide summary statistics for the main variables
of interest. Table 3.6 focuses on those households that have been reported for the full
sample period 1990-2011 (i.e. a "balanced" subsample based on 2,681 households (out of
21,673) with 58,982 observations). However, given the fact that solar PV ownership is
only recorded from 2007 onwards, my sample reduces to a total of 13,000 observations.
For the estimation of the lifecycle model I focus on this balanced subsample for which I
can observe both income and savings over the entire time horizon.
As shown in Table 3.6, for this subsample, around 7% of all households own a solar
panel. Moreover the data shows some dierences between solar panel owners and non-
owners: income and savings are higher for the group of solar panel owners, they are
on average better educated, the head of household is younger, and they are more likely
to be the owner of the house. Finally, the group of solar panel owners is more likely
to live in newer houses14 and rural areas.15 Nevertheless, none of these dierences are
statistically signicant. In order to contrast the statistics from the reduced sample with
the full GSOEP sample, Table 3.7 reports the same statistics for all observations, where
the dierences in earning and saving between the two groups become even more evident.
3.3.2 Empirical analysis
In order to evaluate which variables play an important role for the household investment
decision, I use data from GSOEP and run a probability model (Probit) on pooled data for
both the balanced and unbalanced dataset. The results are reported in Table 3.8 to 3.10
in the appendix.
14construction year = 1 if built before 1980, 2 if built between 1980 and 2000, and 3 if later than 2000
15The table also provides dierent opinion variables on noise and air pollution, adequacy of green elds
and parks. These variables can serve as a proxy for living conditions and environmental attitudes.
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The dependent variable in the Probit model is whether the household owns a solar in-
stallation or not. As it is shown in Table 3.8, log income is signicantly correlated with
the solar variable in all specications, but when including lagged savings (column 5) 16.
On the other hand, higher education (education above high school omitted), younger
age of head of household, household size, house ownership, recent year of construction
(after 2000),17, and location (outside of the urban areas) are all factors that are positively
correlated with owing a solar PV plant.
Contrasting these ndings with the full sample (Table 3.9), I nd very similar point
estimates, which are however more precisely estimated, due to the bigger sample size.
For instance, in Table 3.9 additional control variables show up to be statistically signi-
cant and both income and lagged savings are positively correlated with owing a solar PV
plant. Including furthermore aggregate variables (feed-in-taris, cost of solar PV instal-
lation, and electricity price), only the price of electricity shows up to be positively and
signicantly correlated with solar PV ownership at 1%, indicating that solar PV might
serve as insurance against increasing electricity prices.18 As further robustness check,
I run a random-eect Probit model and nd a very similar pattern (results reported in
Table 3.10). Interestingly in the panel model both the level of FIT and the electricity
price are positive and statistically signicant.19 The next section builds on the insights
obtained from the empirical analysis and I construct a model of household investment
in solar PV.
16Note that log income and log savings are highly correlated with a correlation coecient of .39, statis-
tically dierent from zero at 1%
17Changes in building standards might have an impact on the decision to invest in either solar PV or solar
heating when building a new house or renovating an old building.
18Given the increase in household electricity price in recent years, including the price of electricity in
the regression captures a possible time trend. In fact, the ndings are robust to including a linear and
quadratic time trend in the regression.
19The Random eects (RE) model depends on the assumption that the unobserved individual eects are
uncorrelated with other explanatory variables. If the RE Probit is the true model, the reported rho
value being close to unity implies that the panel-level variance component is rather important and
thus the results dier from the pooled estimator.
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3.4 The theoretical model
The here presented dynamic model of discrete choice describes the decision of a house-
hold to investment in a solar PV system. I consider a household that receives in each
period of life stochastic income y. The household faces the choice of how much of his
income to save (At+1) and how much to consume (c). Furthermore, he has the choice of
how much electricity (x) to consume and whether or not to invest in a solar PV plant.
Consumption of both in-kind goods and electricity yields utility. As in Reiss and White
(2005) I do not consider electricity to be consumed directly, rather a demand for electric-
ity is derived from the ow of services provided by household’s durable energy-using
appliances. Hence the amount of electricity consumed can be thought of as a proxy for
the service ow from (durable) appliances20. I follow the literature on durables in a life-
cycle context, similar to Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011), and assume that the
period utility function is of the standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type:
u(ct, xt) =
(g(ct,xt))
1−γ − 1
1− γ
where g(·) is an aggregator function of the service ows from electricity and consump-
tion good. A general choice for the aggregator is of the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) type of the form
g(ct,xt) = [νc
τ
t + (1− ν)x
τ
t ]
1
τ
such that both ct > 0 and xt > 0. Following Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011),
for the numerical simulation and solution, I set the elasticity of substitution τ equal to
zero, given the high sensitivity of τ to the overall specication of preferences and the
limited empirical evidence on substitutability between (service ow from) electricity and
consumption good. Setting τ equal to zero implies that the aggregator takes the form of
a Cobb-Douglas function 21.
u(ct, xt) =
(cνt,(xt)
1−ν)1−γ − 1
1− γ
20Alternatively, as in Jacobsen, Kotchen, and Vandenbergh (2012), electricity is also found to be modeled
to yield direct utility.
21Figure 3.10 in the appendix provides evidence on the positive relationship between log income and log
electricity using data from GSOEP. Higher income is hence related with higher electricity consump-
tion.
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The representative household maximizes the expected lifetime utility over T periods,
subject to the following constraints:
max
ct,xt
Et
T∑
t=1
βt−1u(ct, xt)
s.t.
ct +At+1 + (1− α(1− Ia))xtpe + (G(Qt−1) + pi)IG 6 yt +At(1+ r) + IaFt=tI
At > 0
AT+1 = 0
yt+1 = (1− ρ)µy + ρyt + εy,t+1
Ft = (1− df)Ft−1, F1given
G(Qt−1) = a(Qt−1)
b
where in addition to the above introduced parameters, pe is the price of electricity,
IGis an indicator variable equal to one in the period the household decides to invest.
When investing the household has to pay a one time set-up costG(Qt−1), that depends
on the cumulative technology uptake in the economy at the beginning of the period
(equation 1). The parameter pi on the other hand will be structurally estimated and
can either represent an additional information and search cost (if positive) or capture
the idea that investors receive some kind of "warm glow" when doing something good
for the environment and evaluate their cost below the true technology cost ( Kotchen
(2006)). Ia is an indicator variable equal to one in all periods following investment for
which the household receives FIT. The length of payment of the policy is determined by
the policy parameter horizon h. Ia = 1 hence implies that the household receives the
annual feed in tari Ft=tI . After h years, the household is still able to prot from the
solar plant, reducing his annual electricity bill by a share α. Finally, the household can
invest in bonds at the annual risk-free interest rate r in order to build up a savings stock
and to smooth the consumption prole while facing stochastic income, which evolves
according to the above specied AR(1) process, with εy,t~N(0, σ2ε).22
22The full model estimated in the next section furthermore includes a random i.i.d. utility shock.
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Given the constraint At > 0, the borrowing limit is eectively set to zero, which
means that the household has to build up assets in order to realize investment in a solar
plant.23 By assumption, households live for T periods and given that there is no bequest
motive (AT+1 = 0) it is optimal to consume all savings as well as the remaining net
present value of the solar installation in the last period. For the numerical simulation, I
choose to replicate the time horizon 1990-2011. Given the fact that solar installations are
typically maintenance free and have a life duration exceeding the policy horizon, I do
not model this component. Finally, I make the assumption that each household can only
invest in one plant of average size, and once the household installs this capacity, the sys-
tem cannot be replaced, i.e. there is no resale, destruction or replacement of technology.24
Recursive formulation
In recursive formulation, the state space at time t is given by the vector
Ωt = [y,A,G(Q), F, a, ]
Where y is the household income,A the stock of assets,G(Q) the cost of investment as
a function of cumulative technology uptake, F the Feed-in-tari policy, a the age of the
plant, that is necessary to determine the duration for which F is paid, and , a random
utility shock25. As pointed out above, FIT policy actually depends on three policy pa-
rameters that jointly determine F in each period: the initial FIT level, the degression rate
and the policy horizon. Conditional on the states, the household chooses in each period
of life optimally consumption (savings), electricity as well as whether or not to invest
in a solar PV plant. The investment decision is determined by the following discrete
choice:
V(Ωt) = max {VN(Ωt), VI(Ωt)}
23More realistically, I could experiment with dierent set of borrowing limits related to the income prole
and the value of the solar plant, however this feature would not add additional insight to the discussion
while considerably increasing complexity.
24This assumption is rather realistic for the case of solar PV given customized installation of plants and
the xed incentive schemes.
25The random utility shock is introduced in order to obtain additional variability in the aggregate uptake
path, when matching the data. I allow for three dierent values and make furthermore the assumption
that the utility shock and the income shock are independent from each other.
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where the superscriptN refers to "not investing" and the superscript I refers to "invest-
ing". As outlined above, the one time installation and setup costG(Q) enters the house-
hold budget constraint only in the period of investment. Similar to Cooper and Halti-
wanger (1993), I assume that the installed system becomes productive immediately26,
and also FIT are paid within the same period of installation. Once the investment deci-
sion is taken, FIT are locked in at a level Ft=tI and paid for a years (a 6 h).
Income is modeled as an autoregressive process of order one with unconditional mean
µ, autocorrelation coecient ρy , and error ε.
y′ = (1− ρy)µ+ ρyy+ ε′
Following the Tauchen (1986) procedure, this process can be approximated by a Markov
transition matrix 27 The autocorrelation coecient as well as the standard deviation of
the income shock have been estimated with GSOEP data. I moreover assume the price of
electricity pe to be xed in order to focus on the impact of the policy channel. F follows
an exogenously given deterministic discount rates df, set by the policy maker, while
the cost of technologyG(Q) is endogenously determined, depending on the cumulative
uptake in the previous period.
F′ = (1− df)F, with df < 1
Substituting in the budget constraint for consumption, the household determines sav-
ings (assets next period, A′) and the optimal amount of electricity x. Note that while A′
is a dynamic choice, the optimal electricity choice is static.
The value function for investing VI(·) is given by
VI(Ωt) = max
A′,x
{(u(y+A(1+ r) + FIa − (1− α(1− Ia))xp−A
′ − IGG(Q), x)+
+βEy′,′|yV
I(y′, A′, F, a′, ′))
26In 2011 the average time of installation has been 5.3 weeks with a standard deviation of 2.2 weeks for
Germany (Seel, Barbose, and Wiser (2013)).
27I allow for seven income states.
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On the other hand, the value function for not investing VN(·), is the utility of con-
sumption of the household in the current period y + A(1 + r) − xp − A′ plus the
continuation value V(·) which depends upon the choice of investing in the successive
periods. Hence VN(·) is dened as
VN(Ωt) = max
A′,x
{(u(y+A(1+ r) − xp−A′, x) + βEy′,′|yV(y′, A′, G′, F
′
′)}
Both subject to the constraints:
A′ > 0
A′T = 0
Given the nite time horizon, the model can be solved backward. Starting at period
T, it is optimal for the household not to accumulate any further savings (A′T = 0). Thus,
conditional on the realization of the income and the random utility shock, as well as the
other states, the household choses optimally A′. The optimal choice for electricity can
be found using the rst order condition of utility with respect to electricity, ∂u(c,x)
∂x
= 0,
which implies:
c
x
=
ν[pe(1− α(1− Ia))]
(1− ν)
In the standard version of this model, the ratio of consumption to electricity is equal
to the ratio of the coecient ν
(1−ν)
, however given the fact that electricity enters the
utility function both directly and indirectly through the budget constraint, the nomina-
tor depends additionally on the price of electricity pe and the age of the solar PV plant
(receiving FIT or not). The optimal saving-consumption path as well as electricity choice
can be obtained by iterating backward until period t = 1. The backward solution also
provides me with the investment decision of the household in the solar PV plant.
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3.5 Estimation
A rst set of parameters describing the income process as well as the learning model are
estimated using ordinary least square (OLS) regression before solving the model numeri-
cally. In order to estimate the income process, I rst linearly detrend the income variable
as the model does not allow for a trend. Furthermore I estimate a linear version of the
learning model (equation 1), as derived in the appendix. The estimated coecient b is
the learning curve parameter and relates directly to the learning rate in a given industry.
The learning rate, dened as (1 − 2b) expresses hence the cost decrease of producing
one unit due a a doubling of aggregate output. Using data for the sample period 1990-
2011, I nd b = −0.23, which implies a learning rate of around 14.7%28. Wand and
Leuthold (2011) provide an overview of estimated learning rates for solar PV and shows
that at global level learning rates are between 18% and 22%. Estimation results for both
the income regression and learning rate can be found in the appendix.
Moreover, given the interest rate r, I set the discount rate β = 1
1+r
. The parameters to
be estimated structurally are summarized by Θ = (γ, ν, pi, λz), where both γ and ν are
utility parameter describing risk aversion and share of income spent on electricity and
consumption good. The remaining structural parameters relate to the additional "cost"
that a household experiences when investing in a solar plant, pi, and the scaling factor
for the standard deviation of the random utility shock λz.
I estimate the set of structural parameters using simulated method of moments (SMM)29:
For a given set of parameters, I solve the model and simulate the life of 10,000 agents
in order to calculate the investment share in solar as well as the correlation, mean and
standard deviation of key variables such as electricity consumption, savings and saving
to income ratio. I furthermore verify that the predicated and realized investment paths
28 Lobel and Perakis (2011) nd a learning curve parameter of -.12 for German solar PV, which is lower
due to the fact that they limit their sample to the period prior to 2007 as well as the choice to include
all PV installations up to 30kwp.
29Alternatively, it would be possible to infer the utility parameters from the rst order condition of VI(·),
a continuous function, and estimate the Euler Equation by Generalized Method of Moments. This
procedure would have the advantage that the model can be estimated without solving it numerically.
However the small number of investors in the GSOEP data and the short time dimension make this
approach unfeasible.
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are consistent 30. The detailed set of micro moments can be found in the appendix.
Following Adda and Cooper (2000), I minimize a joint criteria consisting of the ag-
gregate sales path, expressed as the squared distance between predicted and observed
sales of solar PV, weighted by α, the empirical inverse of the variance
L1(Θ) = α[Ft − Ft(Θ)]
2
and the squared distance of the simulated and observed micro level moments, weighted
byW, the optimal weighting matrix obtained from the empirical data.31
L2(Θ) = (ΨD − ΨS(Θ))′W(ΨD − ΨS(Θ))
Thus, the joint criterium that is minimized in order to obtain the structural parameters
is
min
Θ
L(Θ) = L1 + L2 (3.1)
I nd a parameter of risk aversion γ = 4.696, which seems to be of reasonable mag-
nitude. Even though the economic literature is far from agreeing on the exact size of
the risk aversion parameter for CRRA type utility functions, as pointed out in Dohmen,
Falk, Human, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) who investigate individual risk atti-
tudes for Germany, a CRRA coecients in the interval [0,5] can t most of the empirical
observations.32 The utility parameter ν = 0.951 on the other hand determines the share
of consumption good and electricity for each unit of income. Looking at the average
electricity expenditure share of income in the empirical data, I nd it around 2.8%. In
fact the model ts almost perfectly the mean electricity consumption and standard de-
viation of the data.33. The estimated "cost" parameter pi = −2.837 shows a negative
30This implies consistent believes of households regarding the cost of solar PV, given the learning-by-
doing model.
31While estimating with unit weights would lead to consistent estimates, it would not be ecient. The
appendix describes in detail the estimation algorithm and how the weighting matrix has been obtained
from the empirical data.
32 Dohmen, Falk, Human, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) also show that the distribution of CRRA
coecients is heavily skewed towards the right and that there is an important number of individuals
found to have risk aversion coecients of 10 or larger.
33The complete set of moments can be found in the appendix.
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Paramter value
γ 4.696
ν 0.951
pi -2.837
λz 0.482
Table 3.1: SMM parameter estimates
sign.34 Hence, the ’perceived’ cost of a solar plant lies almost 3000 Euros below the
actual cost.35 Considering the average cost of a plant of 43,000 EUR for the period 1990-
2011 (30,000 EUR for the sub-period 2000-11) this translates into an non-negligible price
reduction of around 6% (9%). Finally, the variance of the individual utility shock param-
eter λz = 0.482 is found to be important too. This parameter estimate translates into a
standard deviation of the random utility shock of 0.048.36
3.6 Simulation and policy experiments
Before analyzing the impact of distinct policies on solar PV uptake, I show results for
the benchmark case. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the complete model parameters, that
are used to simulate the model. The FIT policy is modeled as it has been in place since
2000 (see Figure 3.4 in the appendix).
Analyzing the aggregate sales path and comparing the empirical data with the simu-
lated one (Figure 3.2), I nd that the model describes well the shape of the data, i.e. the
recent rise of solar PV investment; however it highly over predicts investment shares.
While in the empirical data, the solar PV market penetration 37 is below 1.5% , in the
34For the correct interpretation, the estimate has to be multiplied by 1000.
35Note that pi could be also interpreted in an alternative way, as it might captures unobserved factors that
are not explicitly modeled, but that inuence the aggregate uptake in the empirical data.
36I acknowledge the importance of adding standard errors to the here presented point estimates. This is
currently work-in-progress.
37Dened as solar PV installations over market size in a given year; where the market size is based on
the total number of households in 1990 minus the households that installed in t− 1
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Interest'rate 4.2 Percent
Discount'rate 0.959
Price'electricity 0.23 Euro'/'kwh
Income'parameters
Mean'household'income 34354 Euro
Autocorellation'coeff. 0.857
Std(income) 8925 Euro
Solar'installation
Avg'plant'size 6.31 kwp
Avg'electricity'produced 5521 kwh'/'year
Share'of'autoconsumption 30 Percent
FIT'Policy'Parameters
Fit'(2004) 0.57 Euro'/'kwh
Degression'rate 5 Percent
Horizon 20 years
Learning'Parameters
ln(a)' 9.113
b P0.232
Table 3.2: Model parameterization
model economy, the investment share reaches 50%38.
Using the benchmark scenario, I simulate dierent FIT policy changes that could be
implemented to reduce the cost of FIT policies. Note however that, given the partial
equilibrium setup of the model, I cannot make claims regarding overall welfare impacts
of policy changes, as this would require specifying an explicit objective function of the
policymaker which should include general equilibrium considerations 39
I study the impact of policy changes in each of the three key elements that jointly de-
termine the FIT schedule (initial level of FIT, annual degression rate and policy horizon)
to identify the most eective feature in terms of uptake. The appendix (Figure 3.6-3.9)
shows the aggregate uptake path for each of the experiments. In Figure 3.6, the FIT rate
is revised downwards by 20% in 2004. Compared to the benchmark simulation, the num-
ber of installations remains almost 20% below the original path and only in the nal year
recovers to aggregate installation numbers comparable with the original path. In case
38As suggested by the GSOEP data, the empirical number of households owing solar PV plants would be
considerably larger considering only those households that are "owners" of their private houses. One
possibility to better match the lower uptake path would be to include additional heterogeneity in the
model, for example in terms of household size groups.
39In fact, it was a strategic choice of the German government to implement the EEG act, in order to
promote "green growth" and the creation of new jobs in the solar industry.
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Figure 3.2: Predicted and realized technology uptake
the benchmark level was reached in the last period, this would be clearly a favorable
scenario for the policy maker as higher investment at a later point in time are less costly
in terms of policy support. Changing the degression rate, on the other hand (Figure 3.7),
has quantitatively the biggest impact on aggregate uptake. Also in this case, the initial
uptake is unaected, from year 2007 onwards, nevertheless the number of installations
remains around 43% below the benchmark case, and recovers only in 2011.
Figure 3.8 shows the results when the horizon is downward revised to 15 years. Inter-
estingly this policy measure does not lead to an initial drop in the investment compared
to the baseline, but at later years it reduces the uptake similarly to the degression rate,
with quantitatively smaller impact. Given the FIT schedule, 15 year of policy support are
enough to make the investment protable, as the cost of solar drops heavily once there
are sucient investors. Finally, an interesting implication can be found when looking
at the impact of an increase in the price of electricity on the aggregate solar PV uptake.
A doubling in the household electricity price leads to a steeper technology uptake path
and higher overall adoption. As pointed out in the empirical section, households might
decide to invest in solar PV in order to insure against rising electricity prices.40
40FIT are nanced through a surcharge on the cost of electricity. The surcharge for 2012 was 3.59 cent per
kWh electricity (considering an average price of 23 cent / kWh for the period 1990-2011 this represents
a share of around 15%.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper has the objective to investigate the impact of feed-in tari policies (FIT) and
their design features on the household investment decision in solar PV. For this purpose,
I build a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of household investment to simulate
current policies as well as to analyze alternative policy scenarios.
A preliminary empirical analysis reveals that both income and savings are important
household variables correlated with the investment decision in a solar PV plant. The
model presented in this paper builds on these empirical insights and performs a series of
policy experiment in order to assess how changes in key policy parameters (individually)
can impact the investment decision of the household and the aggregate uptake path. I
nd that the dierent policy parameters have an heterogenous impact on the household
incentives and translate to dierences in the aggregate technology uptake path. A re-
duction in the degression rate hence has the biggest negative impact on investment. I
also nd that an increase in electricity prices is positively correlated with new installa-
tions, a feature that is also present in empirical data.
The paper furthermore shows that there are important gains related to modeling the
investment decision of the household using a detailed micro founded model. Future
work, analyzing the optimal FIT schedule, could hence build on these insights and use
the modeling setup together with the generated demand for PV as input for a policy
maker’s objective function in order to minimize overall cost while targeting a certain
level of technology penetration.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Estimation
Income process
In order to maximize the number of observations to estimate the autocorrelation coef-
cient, I use the full panel time dimension 1984-201141. Given the fact that the GSOEP
data only provides monthly net household income, I construct an annual series by multi-
plying monthly income by 1242, and clean for outliers by dropping the rst and then 99th
percentile of the data. After deating the series by the annual consumer price index, I
regress income on a time variable in order to obtain a detrended series. In a second step,
I run a pooled regression to estimate the autocorrelation coecient ρ and the standard
deviation of the shock. εy. The residual of this regression is the standard error of the
income shock, which by construction shows a mean of zero. The standard deviation is
8,925 EUR.
Learning curve
As introduced in the main section, the learning curve model species that the cost of
solar depends on total cumulative production. To be more precise G, the cost of an
installation depends on the total past number of installations at the beginning of the
period (Qt−1). The model assumes that the average cost of producing the marginal unit
has constant elasticity relative to cumulative output. In order to estimate the learning
curve parameters empirically, I take the logarithm yielding
lnGt = lna+ blnQt−1
The coecient b is expected to be negative and captures the decrease in average cost
when cumulative output increases by 1%. The slope of the learning curve, is dened as
the ratio of average cost of production of one unit as output doubles.
s = C(2Q)/C(Q) = 2b
41I run the regression also only for the time period 1990-2011; results are robust.
42This can hence be seen as a lower bound for net annual household income.
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Table 3.3: Auxiliary Regression: In-
come
Dependent variable:
Income (1)
β / SE
l.income 0.857***
(0.001)
Constant –79.349***
(22.629)
Observations 156601
R2 0.731
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Hence when cumulative output doubles, the cost of producing one unit decreases by
(1-s)%. This concept is widely referred to as learning rate.
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship in logs between the cost of solar PV and total house-
hold installations. Table 3.4 reports the estimation results. I nd a point estimate for
b = −.23, which corresponds to a learning rate of 14.87%.
Structural Estimation
In order to estimate the set of structural parameters Θ = (ν, γ, pi, λz), I use two set of
moments. Firstly, I match aggregate investment shares in solar PV. For this purpose I
aggregate individual installations by year and form investment shares dividing them by
the total number of households in 1990.43 The second set of moments is related to the
micro data obtained from GSOEP. I calculate a total of seven data moments, which are
the correlation between savings and income, the mean and standard deviation of elec-
43When calculating investment shares, I take into account the decreasing market size each year, given
that investment is an absorbing state.
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Figure 3.3: Estimated learning curve for household solar PV installations.
tricity consumption, of savings as well as of the saving-to-income ratio.
The optimal weighting matrix for the micro moments is obtained using the variance-
covariance matrix of the empirical momentsΩD by bootstrapping:
W =
( 1
(1+ S)
ΩD
)−1
where S is the length of the bootstrap sample. In order to calculate W, I draw 1,000
bootstrap samples from the empirical data and compute the moments for each sample.
The vector of moments are then used to determine the variance-covariance matrixΩD44.
For the structural estimation, I solve the minimization problem, described in (2) in two
stages. First I run a simulated annealing algorithm45 and use the obtained estimates in a
second stage with fminsearch, in order to rene the results.46 This procedure is likely
to overcome the issue of local minima in which the fminsearch algorithm might get
trapped.
44See Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993)
45Matlab global optimization toolbox simulannealbnd
46For robustness, I experiment using the simulated annealing algorithm with dierent set of starting
values.
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Table 3.4: Auxiliary Regression: Learning rate
Dependent variable:
Log price (1)
β / SE
L.Log cumm. HH installations –0.232***
(0.023)
Constant 9.113***
(0.058)
Observations 20
R2 0.849
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard er-
rors in parentheses.
Moments Empirical/(GSOEP) Simulated/(n=10000)
corr(inc,sav) 0.377 0.124
mean(ele) 3135.639 3203.300
sd(ele) 1654.496 1672.500
mean(saving) 5366.443 3202.000
sd(saving) 6730.842 1090.100
mean(sav/inc) 0.137 0.104
sd(sav/inc) 0.112 0.036
Table 3.5: Micro Moments in the empirical data and from model simulation
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Figure 3.4: FIT policy data and model
3.8.2 Simulation
Averaging over 10,000 individuals, the mean income prole is practically at (see Figure
3.5). However stochastic income and the random utility shock translate into variation
in consumption, given the household’s precautionary savings motive.
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Figure 3.5: Simulation for the average household, 1990-2011, n=10000
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Figure 3.6: Policy simulation: Initial FIT level -20%
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Figure 3.7: Policy simulation: Degression rate 9%
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Figure 3.8: Policy simulation: 15 years FIT horizon
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Figure 3.9: Policy simulation: Price of electricity doubles
3.8.3 Empirical evidence
Figure 3.10: Relationship between log income and log electricity
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics: balanced panel 1990-2011
all solar no solar
HH net income 29524 36145 29036
(15211) (16667) (14983)
HH annual savings 4983 6034 4894
(7184) (7851) (7118)
Observations 12539 880 11659
Solar PV 0.07 1.00 0.00
(0.25) (0.00) (0.00)
Education
< highschool 0.17 0.11 0.17
(0.37) (0.31) (0.38)
highschool 0.60 0.52 0.61
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
> highschool 0.23 0.36 0.22
(0.42) (0.48) (0.41)
Age head of HH 58.83 57.32 58.94
(15.52) (13.52) (15.65)
Size of HH 1.84 2.05 1.82
(0.64) (0.59) (0.64)
Owner 0.49 0.74 0.47
(0.50) (0.44) (0.50)
Construction year 2.00 2.14 1.99
(0.88) (0.94) (0.87)
Distance to city 3.20 3.47 3.18
(1.50) (1.44) (1.50)
Complain noise 1.89 1.91 1.89
(0.92) (0.97) (0.92)
Complain air 1.79 1.83 1.79
(0.85) (0.87) (0.85)
Complain green 1.40 1.29 1.41
(0.73) (0.63) (0.74)
Electricity 2781.36 2771.91 2781.91
(1604.41) (1439.24) (1613.74)
Observations 13220 921 12299
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics: All observations 1990-2011
all solar no solar
HH annual savings 32444 41557 31727
(18576) (19938) (18273)
HH annual savings 5934 8704 5681
(12013) (26133) (9713)
Observations 42749 3184 39565
Solar PV 0.07 1.00 0.00
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
Education
< highschool 0.13 0.08 0.13
(0.33) (0.27) (0.34)
highschool 0.61 0.55 0.62
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
> highschool 0.26 0.37 0.25
(0.44) (0.48) (0.43)
Age head of HH 57.73 55.54 57.90
(15.50) (13.16) (15.66)
Size of HH 1.87 2.15 1.85
(0.66) (0.63) (0.66)
Owner 0.53 0.82 0.51
(0.50) (0.38) (0.50)
Construction year 2.12 2.32 2.11
(0.96) (1.01) (0.95)
Distance to city 3.22 3.59 3.19
(1.48) (1.46) (1.48)
Complain noise 1.86 1.81 1.86
(0.94) (0.93) (0.94)
Complain air 1.71 1.67 1.71
(0.83) (0.83) (0.83)
Complain green 1.34 1.25 1.35
(0.68) (0.57) (0.69)
Electricity 2800.64 2874.43 2797.84
(1707.18) (1737.51) (1706.07)
Observations 48459 3520 44939
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Table 3.8: Probit: balanced panel
Dependent variable:
Solar PV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
ln(income) 0.431*** 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.194*** 0.078
(0.036) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.069)
L. ln(saving) 0.020
(0.028)
< Highschool –0.249*** –0.253*** –0.258*** –0.133
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.085)
Highschool –0.222*** –0.226*** –0.230*** –0.224***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.052)
Age head of HH –0.002 –0.003* –0.002* –0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size of HH:2-3 0.195*** 0.208*** 0.196*** 0.264***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.070)
Size of HH: >3 0.205*** 0.225*** 0.203*** 0.383***
(0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.098)
Owner 0.421*** 0.433*** 0.409*** 0.382***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.054)
Constr. yr >1949, <=1980 0.105** 0.111** 0.120*** 0.068
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.055)
Constr. yr >1980, <=2000 0.029 0.030 0.039 –0.054
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.067)
Constr. yr > 2000 0.238*** 0.226** 0.254*** 0.143
(0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.111)
Distance to city 0.057*** 0.047***
(0.013) (0.016)
Complain noise –0.010 –0.026
(0.028) (0.036)
Complain air 0.067** 0.076**
(0.029) (0.038)
Observations 12240 11442 11442 11442 6929
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.057 0.068 0.072 0.063
Aggregate controls N N Y Y Y
The regression results are robust to the inclusion of linear and quadratic time trends.
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Table 3.9: Probit: unbalanced panel
Dependent variable:
Solar PV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
ln(income) 0.481*** 0.166*** 0.170*** 0.206*** 0.121***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.039)
L. ln(saving) 0.059***
(0.016)
< Highschool –0.089** –0.094** –0.089** 0.023
(0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.056)
Highschool –0.089*** –0.091*** –0.108*** –0.085***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031)
Age head of HH –0.004*** –0.004*** –0.005*** –0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size of HH: 2-3 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.114*** 0.183***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043)
Size of HH: >3 0.290*** 0.304*** 0.257*** 0.360***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.055)
Owner 0.592*** 0.604*** 0.570*** 0.520***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033)
Constr. yr >1949, <=1980 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.120*** 0.120***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033)
Constr. yr >1980, <=2000 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.051
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038)
Constr. yr > 2000 0.476*** 0.462*** 0.475*** 0.477***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.054)
Distance to city 0.081*** 0.078***
(0.007) (0.009)
Complain noise –0.015 –0.033
(0.016) (0.021)
Complain air 0.039** 0.056**
(0.018) (0.022)
Observations 41083 39667 39667 34636 20490
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.085 0.095 0.102 0.094
Aggregate controls N N Y Y Y
The regression results are robust to the inclusion of linear and quadratic time trends.
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Table 3.10: Random eects Probit:
unbalanced panel
Dependent variable:
Solar PV β / SE
ln(income) 0.371***
(0.108)
Education: < Highschool –0.088
(0.198)
Education: Highschool –0.248**
(0.113)
Age head of HH –0.017***
(0.004)
Size of HH: 2-3 0.288**
(0.134)
Size of HH: >3 0.710***
(0.176)
Owner 1.213***
(0.112)
Constr. yr >1949, <=1980 0.163
(0.113)
Constr. yr >1980, <=2000 0.107
(0.130)
Constr. yr > 2000 1.289***
(0.192)
Distance to city 0.132***
(0.031)
Complain noise –0.073
(0.063)
Complain air 0.079
(0.070)
Cost solar PV 0.000
(0.000)
FIT policy 10.210***
(2.346)
Price electricity 104.319***
(16.694)
Constant –43.454***
(5.584)
ln(σ2(u)) 3.405
Rho 0.967
Observations 34636
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
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